Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 35, Issue 4

2017

Article 4

The Center cannot Hold: Assessing the Reach
of China’s Labor Protections of Migrant
Workers in Africa
Tonya Rodgers∗

∗

Fordham University School of Law

Copyright c 2017 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD:1 ASSESSING THE

REACH OF CHINKS LABOR PROTECTIONS TO
MIGRANT WORKERS IN AFRICA
Tonya Rodgers*
INTRODUCTION
I. CHINA'S GREAT LEAP SOUTHWARD: HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. China's Relationship with Africa
B. The Chinese Worker Experience in Africa
C. South Africa's Unique Relationship with China
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS THAT PROTECT CHINESE
WORKERS IN AFRICA
A. Worker Protections Provided by International Law
B. Protections Provided by China*s Employment Laws
1. China's Labor and Labor Contract Laws
2. Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor
Disputes
3. Recommendations for Improved Enforcement
C. Protections in South Africa's Employment Laws
III. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDE
INADEQUATE PROTECTIONS TO CHINESE
WORKERS IN AFRICA
A. Inadequacies Under Chinese and South African Law
B. China Should Expand Coverage of Its New Labor Laws
C. South Africa Should Engage China at the National and
Enterprise Levels
CONCLUSION

1076
1080
1080
1087
1092
1097
1097
1100
1100
1104
1106
1107

1113
1114
1116
1119
1120

* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., Anthropology
and English, 2004, Case Western Reserve University. The Author would like to thank
Professor Carl Minzner and the editorial board of the Fordhain IrternationalLaw Journalfor
their valuable input and guidance. She also would like to thank Nancy, Tom, and Joe Rodgers,
and Harry Jean-Pierre for their support and encouragement.
1. "Things fall apart: the centre cannot hold ..." William Butler Yeats, The Second
Confing, in \ILLIAM BUTLER YEATS: SELECTED POEMS AND FOUR PLAYS 89, 89 (4th ed.
1996).
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VITR ODUCTION
In November 2011, Human Rights Watch ("HRW") released, to
great media attention, a report documenting the abuses by Chinese
state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") against local miners in Zambia. A
sweeping indictment of their labor practices, the report charges that,
among other things, Chinese mine operators routinely coerce
Zambian workers to toil in unsafe and unhealthy conditions for long
hours at low wages in violation of domestic and international law.
This is one of the only in-depth studies by a nongovernmental
organization ("NGO") to focus on China's human rights record in
Africa thus far.4 Its authors, however, are certainly not the first to
allege widespread labor violations by Chinese firms throughout the
continent. A growing body of literature is exposing similar abuse of
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "YOU'LL BE FIRED IFYou REFUSE": LABOR ABUSES IN
CHINESE STATE-OWNED COPPER MINES 1 5 (2011) (documenting numerous abuses by
Chinese mine operators in Zambia). See, e.g.,
David Smith, Chinese ining Firms inZambia
Under Fire for Mistreating Iforkers, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Nov.
3, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2011 /nov/03/chinese-mining-zambiamistreating-workers (reporting on the Human Rights Watch ("i-RW") study and additional
labor developments inZambia's mining industry); Ann M. Simmons, Chinese Copper Firms
in Zambia Abusing ff'orkers, Rights Group Says, L.A. TIMES WORLD NOW BLOG (Nov. 3,
2011, 2:17 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com'world-now/2011/11/chinese-companieszambia-abuse.html (summarizing the report and highlighting key findings); Matt Wells, China
in Zambia: Trouble Down in the Mines, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2011, 2:20 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mnatt-wells/cina-in-zamnbia-trouble-d b 1102080.html
(featuring an editorial by one of the researchers of the HRW report). HRW isa nonprofit,
international nongovernmental organization that investigates and reports on human rights
issues
throughout
the
world.
See
About
UIs,
HLUTAN
RIGHTS
WATCH.,
http://www .hrw.orgiabout (last visited Apr. II, 2012).
3. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 4 6 (reporting failures to properly
ventilate mines, frequent injuries, refusal to replace safety equipment, illegally excessive
working hours, and withholding pay when workers refuse to engage in unsafe practices and
that many of these abuses violate Zambian law and several international conventions to which
they are signatories).
4. See HIUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at I (stating that "while many
commentaries have examined the ambivalent relationship between China and Africa, few have
systematically examined wvhat Chinese investment means in human rights terms"); see, e.g.,
DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, 1HE DRAGON'S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA 284
87, 299-301 (2009) (citing, in addition to briefer journalistic works, only the findings of 1-RW
and CHINESE INVESTIMENTS

N AFRICA: A Li3oLTR PERSPECTIVE (Anthony Yaw Baah &

Herbert Jauch eds., 2009) in a discussion of human rights issues regarding China inAfrica).
5. Describing Chinese labor and business practices in South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia,
The Economist proclaimed: "Chinese expatriates in Africa come fron a rough-and-tumble,

anything-goes business culture that cares little about rules and regulations. Local sensitivities

2012]

CHJVESE AIGRANT WORKERS J7V AFRICA

1077

African workers at the hands of Chinese employers across countries
and industries. 6
Less documented, however, are the conditions that Chinese
nationals face while working for many of the same private and staterun firms that are under scrutiny for mistreating locals. Chinese
corporations tend to hire more of their own nationals than any other
foreign firms operating in Africa. ' Although the numbers vary,
sources estimate that between five hundred thousand and one million
Chinese citizens currently live on the continent, with migrant contract
workers comprising the largest portion of this group. 9 While the
are routinely ignored at home, and so abroad." Tti ing to Pull Together; The Chinese in Africa,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 23, 2011, at 74; see SERGE MICHEL & MICHEL BEURET, CHINA SAFARI: ON
THE TRAIL OF BEIJING'S EXPANSION IN AFRICA 81 83 (2009) (describing abuses by Chinese

supervisors against local construction workers in Congo-Brazzaville); Chris McGreal Lusaka,
Thanks China, Nou; Go Home, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 5, 2007, at 21 (describing the plight of
African workers in Chinese mines and textile factories).
6. See, e.g., BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4. at 299-301 (documenting reports of
environmental, child labor, and minimum wage violations in the Democratic Republic of
Congo ("DRC"), Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, and Sierra Leone). See generally MICHEL &
BELET, supra note 5 (describing health, safety. wage. and antiunion violations committed by
Chinese firms throughout the continent); Ching Kwan Lee, Rau; Encounters: Chinese
Managers, African Workers and the Politics of Casualization in Africa's Chinese Enclaves,
199 CHINA Q. 647 (2009) (focusing his study on labor conditions at a Chinese owned copper
mine in Zambia and a textile factory in 'Tanzania); CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A
LABOUR PERSPECTIVE (Anthony Yaw Baah & Herbert Jauch eds., 2009) (describing, inter
alia, wage arrears, excessive hours, unsafe conditions, and physical abuse at Chinese work
sites in Africa).
7. See GILES MOHAN & DINAR KALE, THE INVISIBLE HAND OF SOUTH-SOUTH
GLOBALISATION: CHINESE MIGRANTS IN AFRICA 19 (2007) (declaring that future research is

needed to monitor labor policies and relations among Chinese migrants in Africa); Malia
Politzer, China and Africa: StrongerEconomic Ties Mean More Migration, MIGRATION INFO.
SOLRCE (Aug. 2008), http://www.inigrationinformation.org/feature/display, c m?ID 690
(stating that "there is very little scholarly or empirical research on recent Chinese migration to
Africa"); see also Lee, supra note 6, at 665 (concluding that although writings on China in
Africa are numerous, they provide minimal information about 'the foot-soldiers of Chinese
projects on the ground").
8.

See HARRY G. BROADMAN, WORLD BANK, AFRICA'S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND

INDIA'S NEW EcoNOMic FRONTIER 250-51 (2007) (citing a 2006 World Bank survey of
African, European, Chinese, and Indian firms in Africa, which tound that the Chinese hire the
highest percentage of workers from their home country); see also Deborah Brautigam, Chinese
Workers
in
Africa,
CHINA
EN
AFRICA:
TH
REAL
STORY,
http://w-vNv.chinaafricarealstoTy.com/p/chinese-workers-in-africa-anecdotes.htnl
(last visited
Nov. 29, 2011) (observing that although 'ji]t's widely believed that Chinese companies refuse
to hire Africans and bring in all their own workers.... [t]he real story is more complicated").
9. See Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that migrant workers on contract comprise the
largest group of Chinese in Africa). Compare BRALUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 155 (estimating
that anywhere from 300,000 to 750,000 people fiom mainland China have come to Africa to
work since 1990s), and YOON JUNG PARK, CHINA IN AFRICA PROJECT, CHINESE MIGRATION
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literature on African workers commoniy invokes international and
domestic labor standards, it is unclear what domestic protections and
remedies are available to Chinese workers in Africa when their rights
are violated.10
Labor practices are merely one of a myriad of concerns
surrounding China's rapid expansion and influence in Africa. "
Indeed, with over eight hundred Chinese companies, including
mining, timber, telecommunications, construction, and manufacturing
enterprises operating in forty-nine countries, the China-in-Africa story
provides fertile grounds for analysis. 2 In particular, labor will play an
important role as focus turns to the implications of China's
investments in Africa's long-term development. 13 Although crossborder trade and investment involve large state and corporate actors
operating on the international stage, their transactions ultimately play
out at the local level, with individual workers. 1 4 For Chinese workers,
IN AFRICA 3 (2009) (indicating that the population of Chinese in Africa ranges from 580,000
to 800,000), with Alex Shoumatoff. Agony and Ivory, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2011, at 128
(reporting that, "[i]n the last decade the number of Chinese residents in Africa has grown from
70,000 to more than a million"), and Grace Ng, The Dragon's Mighty Roar, STRAITS TIMES
(Sing.), Aug. 20, 2011, at 3 (claiming that "[o]ne million or so Chinese live in Africa"), and
MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that many members of the African press
routinely refer to "millions of Chinese").
10. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6 8 (encouraging Zambia and China to
comply with standards set by the International Labour Organization (ILO")). See generally
ILO MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK ON LABOUR MIGRATION: NON-BINDING PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH To LABOUR MIGRATION (2006) [hereinafter
ILO FRAMIEWORK] (acknowledging that international labor migration poses various challenges
in assuring migrants' rights are protected and that gaps exist between international and
domestic legal protections).
11. See generally BR1kLTIGAM, supra note 4 (exploring the major aid and investment
issues influencing China's relationship with Africa); MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5
(exploring the major investment, trade, and sociocultural issues implicated by China's growing
presence in Africa).
12. See BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 2 (listing the major industries in which China is
involved in Africa); Anthony Yaw Baah & Herbert Jauch, Chinese Investments in Africa, in
CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6. at 35, 35
(reporting that by 2008 about 800 Chinese companies operated throughout forty-nine African
states): see also MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that China's presence in
Africa has become a central theme in international relations).
13. See Anthony Yaw Baah & Herbert Jauch, Executive Summary, in CHINESE
INVESTMENTS N AFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 11, 14-15 (highlighting
the important role labor should play in Africa-China relations and in Africa's overall strategic
development); see also Lee, supra note 6, at 647 (stating that generally labor policies impact
Chinese investments, which in turn impact African development).
14. See Colin Fenwick et al., Labour Law: A Southern African Perspective, in LABOLTR
LAW AND WORKER PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 175, 194 96 (Tzehainesh Tekl1
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this story is complicated by the fact that the protections provided by
their home laws may not necessarily reach them in Africa. 15 If the
People's Republic of China ("PRC") is to maintain the legitimate
cooperative relationship it claims to share with its African partners,
the rights and interests of Chinese
workers should be secured along
6
with those of local workers)
This Note provides an overview of the experience of Chinese
workers in Africa. As their situations vary from industry to industry
and from country to country, this Note focuses primarily on Chinese
workers in South Africa and the protections provided to this group by
one of the continents most developed and democratic states. 17
Because it possesses a sophisticated labor court system, a
constitutional commitment to enforcing labor rights, and the
continent's largest Chinese migrant population, this Note argues that
South Africa's legal system is best equipped, among African states, to
provide protections to Chinese nationals working within its borders. 8
ed., 2010) (stating that in sub-Saharan Africa, pursuing economic and political objectives often
comes at the expense of worker protection): Lee, supra note 6. at 651-52 (predicting that
African workers will "bear the burnt" of Chinese attempts to replicate their domestic
development and labor policies in Africa).
15. See, e.g., David Greene, Conflicts of Law and Choice of Law Issues in Crossborder
Employment DisTputes , in INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW: THE MIULTINATIONAL
EMPLOYER AND THE GLOBAL WORKFORCE 53, 53 54 (Christian T. Campbell & Donald C.

Dowling, Jr. eds., 1999) (noting that complicated choice of law considerations can have
negative consequences on ensuring the rights of international workers); ILO FRAMEWORK,
supra note 10, at 15-20 (providing guidelines for individual nations to improve labor
migration policies so as to ensure that domestic laws protect migrant workers).
16. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People's Republic of China, China's African Policy
(Jan. 2006). http://www.china.org.cii/englisl/ifeatures/focac/183721.htm (citing mutual benefit,
common prosperity, mutual support, and common development as some of the policy' s central
objectives). CHINA IN AFRICA PROJECT, THE CHINA-AFRICA TOOLKIT: A RESOURCE FOR
AFRICAN POLICYMAKERS I 2 (2009) (interpreting China's rapid, sustained expansion
throughout Africa as a sign of its commitment to develop long-term partnerships).
17. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 20 (referring to South Africa as a "highperforming

countr[y]

with

better

governanice"):

ECONOMIST

INTELLIGENCE

UNIT,

ECONOMIST, DEMOCLkCY INDEX 2011, at 4 (ranking South Africa number twenty-eighth on
its democracy index behind the 24th- and 26th-ranked African nations of Mauritius and Cape
Verde, respectively).
18. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 23(1) (stating that "everyone has the right to fair labour
practices"); see Randall Peerenboom, Economic and Social Rights: The Role of Courts in
China, 12 SAN DIECo INT'L L.J. 303, 318 (2011) (noting that "South Africa is generally
considered to be a world leader in judicial implementation of [economic and social rights],"
including worker rights); see also MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7, at 3 tbl.I (indicating that
South Africa possesses a larger population of Chinese migrants than any other African
country); Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 12, at 35 (stating that South Africa attracts the largest

amount of Chinese foreign direct investment, an estimated US$6 billion cumulatively);
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Part I defines the scope of the China-in-Africa labor issue, by
first describing the general status of Chinese companies and workers
across Africa. It then details the experience of Chinese companies and
employees in South Africa, host to one of the continent's largest
populations of Chinese migrant workers. 19 Next, Part 11 identifies the
applicable Chinese laws that cover workers even as they temporarily
migrate to Africa. It then examines South Africa's labor law system
and the protections it provides to the foreign nationals it hosts.
Further, Part II assesses the effectiveness of Chinese and South
African labor law in the context of their successes in protecting
domestic migrant workers. Finally, Part III addresses both legal
systems' shortcomings in protecting Chinese workers. It concludes by
making recommendations to actors in the PRC and South Africa to
improve both legal protections to Chinese workers and access to local
dispute resolution mechanisms.
1. CHINA'S GREAT LEAP SO UTHWARD. HISTORICAL AND
LEGAL BACKGROUNID
An understanding of the historical, political, and economic
foundations underlying the current China-Africa relationship helps
illuminate the legal issues surrounding Chinese workers in Africa.
Part I provides an overview of Chinese labor in Africa. Section A
highlights the salient factors shaping the China-Africa relationship.
Section B examines the relationship between Chinese workers and
their Chinese employers in Africa. In light of these continent-wide
observations, Section C identifies the factors that make South Africa's
relationship with China and Chinese enterprises unique.
A. China'sRelationship with Afi ica
Although investment between China and Africa has surged in
recent years, its modern roots developed during the early years of
Chairman Mao Zedong's communist regime.2" Seeking to legitimize

Politzer, supra note 7,at2 (stating that South Africa hosts the continents largest population of
migrant Chinese workers).
19. See MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7. at 3 tbl.1; Politzer, supra note 7. at 2 (citing data
revealing that more Chinese migrants live in South Africa than any other African countru).
20. See BROADNIAN, supra note 8, at 41-42 (explaining, through statistical analysis, that
China and India are atthe center of the recent acceleration in commercial activity between
nations of the developing global South); see also BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 31 42
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the new People's Republic of China, Chairman Mao promoted
anticolonial solidarity with newly independent nations across
Africa.2 ' From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, the PRC sent about
150,000 Chinese workers to Africa to help develop technology,
improve agriculture, build infrastructure, and strengthen medical and
education systems throughout the continent. Perhaps the single
largest and most well-known project of this era was the Tazara
Railway, completed in 1975.23 Financed by the Chinese government
and employing roughly 50,000 Chinese migrant workers and 100,000
African workers, the railroad established a vital link from Zambia's
copper mines to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam. 24
Today, in the wake of market reform, engagement with Africa is
characterized by China's desire to meet its own internal development
goals. 25 Rich in natural resources and largely deficient in basic
infrastructure and services, Africa not only supplies China's domestic
'2

(providing a brief history of China's early political and economic engagement with Africa,
which began in the nid-1950s).
21. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4. at 31-34, 38 (explaining that as a young nation
seeking recognition as the legitimate Chinese government over Taiwan's Nationalist regime,
the People's Republic of China's ("PRC") early engagement with Africa was characterized by
politicall '-motivated efforts to promote fellowship and cooperation with newly independent
states, especially those that indicated they may be moving towards a socialist system); PARK,
supra note 9, at 2-3 (summarizing Chairman Mao Zedong's Africa policy as "purely
political," wvherein Mao engaged mostly countries that now recognize the communist PRC).
22. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 38-42 (describing Chinese state farm projects in
Benin, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania in the 1960s): PARK, supra note 9, at 2 3 (noting that these
numbers included 15,000 to 20,000 medical personnel who helped build clinics, over 10,000
agricultural technicians who established farms, hundreds of teachers, and "many more"
contract workers employed in transportation, telecommunications, school, and dam projects).
23. See CHINA IN AfRICA PROJECT, supra note 16, at 20 (describing the railway as
China's "most celebrated" project); PARK, supra note 9, at 2-3 (describing the 1azara Railway
project as the single largest and most symbolic of China's Africa links during Chairman Mao's
reign).
24. See CHINA IN AFRICA PROJECT, supra note 16, at 20 (stating that the project was
financed by a US$405 million loan from China); MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7, at 12 (stating
that the project employed roughly 25,000 Chinese and 100,000 African workers and created a
critical route to Tanzania's coast); PARK, supra note 9, at 2 3 (estimating that the Tazara
Railway project employed 50,000 Chinese migrants).
25. See Lee, supra note 6. at 647 (identifying demand for raw materials and financial
opportunities as the reasons why China increases its presence in Africa); Yaw Baah & Jauch,
supra note 13, at 11 (observing that the main objective of China's Africa engagement is to
maintain industrialization and economic growth). For a summary of China's "going out"
strategy of economic development, see Chih-shian Liou, The Politics of China's "Going Out"
Strategy: Overseas Expansion of Central State-Owned Enterprises 1-3 (May 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin), available at
http:,,repositories.lib.utexas.eduihandle,2152/ETD-UT-2010-05-826'?show
fi.ll
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industry with the raw materials necessary to sustain its booming
economy, but also provides new investment opportunities for Chinese
companies looking to expand overseas. 26 Across the continent.
Chinese industrial firms are growing more involved in extractive
industries such as oil, mining, and timber. 7 Meanwhile, construction
companies, banks, textile factories, and telecommunications firms are
finding additional opportunities to increase their market share in
Africa." Many of these projects are tied to the huge sums of aid
China has pledged to the continent.2 ' African leaders largely welcome
aid and investment from China because it is still a developing nation
and therefore tends to be eyed with less suspicion than the former
3
imperialist West. 1
Although Chinese firms operate in a broad spectrum of
industries throughout economically and politically diverse African

26. See David Haroz, China in Africa: Symbiosis or Exploitation?, 35 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 65, 71 72 (2011) (citing natural resources, new investment opportunities, and
consumer markets as being among China's interests in Africa); Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note
13, at 12 (reporting that currently there are about 800 Chinese private and state-owned
enterprises operating in Africa). see also Liou, supra note 25, at 178 86 (describing, generally,
how Chinese projects in Africa are driven by domestic demand for natural resources and
investment).
27. See BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 2, 101 03 (stating that extractive commodities
dominate Africa's exports to China and are rapidly growing); CHINA IN AFRICA PROJECT,
supra note 16, at 16 (stating that China has carved out a position in Africa's rich reserves of
hydrocarbons, minerals, and timber).
28. See BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 2 (explaining that China's rapidly modernizing
industries have led to diversification in its African investments, including, inter alia, apparel,
fisheries, commercial real estate, tourism, and telecommunications); CHINA IN AFRICA
PROJECT, supra note 16, at 16 (stating that Chinese firms are staking out positions in banking,
construction, telecommunications, textiles, and other sectors); see also Haroz, supra note 26,
at 72 (noting that in 2008 alone Chinese construction companies earned US$20 billion in
revenue and formed new contracts worth USS39.4 billion).
29. See Li Xiaokun, China Pledges $10 Billion in Loans to Africa, CHPNA DAILY, Nov.
9, 2009, http: iwv-,-,.chiinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-1 I09 content_893027I1.htm (reporting that
Premier Wen Jiabao pledged US$10 billion in loans over three years at the 2009 Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation, twice what he pledged in 2006); see also BRAUTIGATM, supra note
4, at 11 12 (describing China's recent pledging patterns to Africa and their links to African
contract awards).
30. See BRAUTIGANM, supra note 4. at 10-12 (quoting two African leaders complaining
of the general in effectiveness of Western aid and expressing admiration at China's
achievements in dramatically reducing domestic poverty): MICHEL & BELRET. supra note 5. at
106 (claiming that the International Monetary Fund, a symbol of "the West," insulted many
African leaders by attaching conditions to loans); Haroz, supra note 26, at 65-66, 69
(observing that because of the shortcomings of Western aid and because China is still a
developing nation itself-one which never held colonies in Africa- it is largely viewed as a
less threatening presence in Africa than the West).
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nations, many share the common practice of importing a large portion
of their workforce from China. 31 Compared to other foreign
companies, Chinese firms often hire more of their own nationals to
staff skilled technical and low-level positions throughout their African
ventures. 3 In 2007, the PRC officially reported that 67,000 contract
workers went to Africa, more than doubling the existing contract
labor population to 114,000. 33 Other sources estimate that the total
number of Chinese living permanently or semipermanently in Africa
ranges anywhere from 300,000 to 1,000,000.34 This broad disparity
can be attributed to many factors including the weak enforcement of
immigration policies, poor tracking mechanisms, and the tendency of
African immigration officials to categorize most Asian visitors as
Chinese. 3 5 Despite the wide statistical discrepancy, sources agree that
the number of Chinese workers in Africa is only expected to grow. 6

31. See Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 12, at 35-40 (cataloguing the variety of Chinese
investments in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, and Zambia): PARK, supra note 9, at 7 tbl.2
(enmnerating several
different types of Chinese projects throughout several East, Central, West, and North African
countries), BROADMAN, supra note 8 at 250 51 (citing World Bank data revealing that
Chinese firms hire the highest percentage of workers from their home country than any other
international firms in Africa).
32. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4,at154 (stating that Chinese projects do routinely use
more of their owvn nationals as staff than projects carried out by any other country); see also
Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that temporary labor migrants account for the largest portion of
Chinese in Africa and that the number is only expected to grow); BROADMAN, supra note 8,at
250-51 (revealing research that shows Chinese companies hire more of their ovii nationals
than any another international firms in Africa).
33. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 155 n.152; Haroz, supra note 26, at 72 (citing
official figures in the 2008 China Commerce Yearbook, which document that "atthe end of
2007, 114,000 Chinese nationals were officially working in Africa 67,000 of whom had
arrived in the preceding 12 months").
34. Compare BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4,at 155 (citing data that estimates that anywhere
from 300,000 to 750,000 people from mainland China have come to Africa to work since
1990s), and PARK, supra note 9, at 3 (analyzing research to indicate that the population of
Chinese in Africa ranges from 580,000 to 800,000). with Shoumatoff, supra note 9, at 128
(reporting that, 6[i]n the last decade the number of Chinese residents in Africa has grown from
70,000 to more than a million"), and MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 4 (observing that
some African newspapers regularly refer to the "millions of Chinese" in Africa).
35. See BRkUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 155 (attributing the broad discrepancy in reported
numbers to inconsistent immigration practices and an apparent inability by many Africans to
distinguish among groups of non-Indian Asians); PARK,supra note 9, at 3, 5 (observing that
Chinese migration patterns usually favor countries that are easier to enter, and that a growing
population of Chinese are migrating within Africa).
36. See PARK, supra note 9. at 3 (stating that the number of Chinese in Africa is
increasing exponentially); Politzer, snpra note 7 (stating that migration from China to Africa is
"only expected to grow as economic ties become stronger").
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Local conditions and cultural attitudes are the two primary
reasons, at the ground level, for these hiring practices) A shortage of
skilled workers and training opportunities plagues many parts of
Africa, notably post-conflict regions. 3 For these reason, firms prefer
to employ Chinese workers even if they garner higher wages than
their local counterparts and travel from mainland China to Africa is
exceedingly expensive. 31 Managers claim that Chinese workers'
higher skill level and a lack of language barriers enable them to
complete projects at a faster pace.4 ' Additionally, a widely reported
cultural perception among Chinese managers is that the Chinese work
harder than the local African labor force.
Moreover, changing domestic conditions in China also
contribute to the available supply of workers willing to go overseas.4 2
37. See BROADMAN, supra note 8,at 280 (explaining that Chinese construction firms
prefer to hire Chinese workers because it is easier for managers and engineers to communicate
with them): PARK, supra note 9. at 6 (citing costs, culture, and productivity as the main
justifications for employing Chinese nationals).
38. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4,at 156 (observing that a Chinese construction project
in post-civil war Angola had a limited qualified local labor pool from whidl to hire): see also
BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 224 (noting a skilled labor shortage in South Africa, and
explaining that Chinese firms report this problem as the most critical constraint on business in
Africa); Brautigam, supra note 8 (identifying the post-conflict nations of Congo-Brazzaville.
Sierra Leone, and Sudan as locations where Chinese firms employ significant numbers of
Chinese workers).
39. See BRALTIGAM. supra note 4. at 156 (explaining that it is very costly to import
Chinese labor); Liou, supra note 25, at 182 (quoting a Chinese manager as saying that,
although Chinese workers are not necessarily less expensive than local workers, they are
generally more skilled and diligent); see also BROAD
,AN,
supra note 8, at 222-23
(concluding that while it ismore expensive to hire Chinese workers, rigidity in local labor
markets make the decision the most cost-effective option in many instances).
40. See BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 280 (explaining that Chinese construction firms
prefer to hire Chinese workers because itfacilitations communications between management
and workers); PARK, supra note 9, at6 (citing costs, culture, and productivity as the main
arguments for employing Chinese nationals).
41. See, e.g.,
Lusaka, supra note 5,at21 (quoting the general manager of a Chinese-run
project in Zambia who told the author: "Chinese people work until they finish and then rest..
. . [Zambians] have tea breaks and a lot of days off. For our construction company that means
itcosts a lotmore ....");
Liou, supra note 25, at 181 82 (quoting the manager of a stateowned construction company: "Chinese workers in general are more skilled and diligent. Most
importantly, given the same cultural background, they make our management and
communication much easier.").
42. See Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 13, at 12 (linking China's tremendous 770
million-worker domestic labor force and growing income inequality to the govermnent's
policy of encouraging overseas labor migration); see also XIAO CHEN,INT'L LABOUR ORG.,
SOLTLS IN EXILE: A STUDY OF CHINESE MIGRATION WORKERS IN ROMANIA 30-32 (2010)
(concluding that poverty and low local wages. among other factors. influence large crossborder migration flow s from six eastern coastal provinces).
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The sweeping market reforms of the 1980s and 1990s empowered
China's urban SOEs to take greater responsibility for their profits and
losses. 4 As a result, many SOEs started pursuing expansion
opportunities overseas. 4 Even more, however, were forced to
downsize their domestic operations, shedding twenty to thirty million
jobs by 2000.4 These changes have disproportionately affected the
millions of rural Chinese
who moved to urban centers for higher
wages and better jobs. 46 Living outside the cities' official registration
systems and facing grim employment prospects in their hometowns
and villages, these populations are often left to take whatever work
they can get.47 Among other strategies, the PRC has dealt with the
problem of urban unemployment by sending people to work on SOL
projects overseas.48
Against this backdrop of economic reform and rising
unemployment, labor dispatch agencies have emerged to fill a market
43. See JIFU WANG, STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIC RESPONSES: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CHINESE STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 180 (2007) (describing the

market reforms that terminated the PRC's financial support of failing industries) Liou, supra
note 25, at 66 68 (summarizing the changes between 1984 and 1993 that separated state
ownership from enterprise management).
44. See CHINA rN AFRICA PROJECT, supra note 16, at 12-15 (explaining that the gradual
shift to a planned market economy encouraged enterprises to develop global investment
strategies); Liou, supra note 25, at 4 (describing the PRC's role in encouraging state-owned
enterprises ("SOEs") to seek foreign investment opportunities).
45. See WANG, supra note 43, at 8 (documenting the historically significant wave of
unemployment caused by the socialist market transition); WORLD BANK, MID-TERM
EvWLLATION OF CHIFNA'S 11ITH FIVE YEAR PLAN 11 (2009) (noting that market reforms
caused many underperforming enterprises to lay off workers or shut down completely).
46. See RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN
CHIrNA 89-91 (2009) (stating that reforms have both increased migrants' fieedom of
movement while exposing them to greater risk of exploitation and unemployment); see also Li
Jing, China's New Labor Contract Law and Protection of fi'orkers. 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1083, 1088-89 (2008) (providing a brief history of the migrant labor phenomenon in China
and explaining how economic changes have increasingly made them vulnerable to
unemployment and exploitations).
47. See Scan Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospectsfor Regulatotr
Innovation in the People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1050, 1054 (2007)
(stating that migrants are exceptionally vulnerable to market changes and therefore tolerate
poor working conditions because they have no other choice): Jing, supra note 46, at 1083
(noting that because of their status, migrant workers are subject to a variety of abuses
including low wages, unsafe conditions, overtime with no payment, and lack of social
security).
48. See Yaw Baah & Jauch supra note 13, at12 (explaining that one of China's methods
of alleviating domestic unemployment is to send workers overseas either through SOEs or
labor agencies). Liou, supra note 25, at 186 (citing the decrease in workforce redundancy and

industrial overcapacity as reasons the PRC advocates firms' overseas expansion).
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demand for efficient employee recruitment, both for Chinese and
overseas employers.49 Traditionally, labor dispatch agencies serve as
brokers between foreign employers seeking Chinese labor for projects
outside China and Chinese workers seeking better opportunities
overseas. 0 In recent years, however, large numbers of these agencies
have emerged to help large-scale industrial, construction, and
manufacturing firms efficiently recruit and manage their local
workforces. 1 Individuals sign work contracts directly with these
dispatch agencies. which then assume responsibility for managing the
employment relationship and its ensuing liabilities. 2 SOEs and other
government-run projects increasingly utilize these businesses for their
domestic and African employment needs. 53 In fact, the majority of
Chinese workers
in Africa obtain their jobs through labor dispatch
4

agencieS.5

49. See 5
1 $
A T H4, STNA (China), Mar. 17, 2001.
51
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-03-17i173522133927.shtml (describing the labor dispatch
system as undergoing tuee stages of development: foreign related labor dispatch, labor
dispatch during state-owned enterprise reform, and marketized labor dispatch) [hereinafter
Labor Dispatch Systemn in Rforn]. An English translation ofthis news article isavailable at
http://www.clntranslations.org/file download/139, See also Feng Xu, The Emergence of
Teinporatr StaJJing Agencies in China, 30 CoMiP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J.431, 434-35 (2008)
(explaining how, as a result of the economic developments since the 1980s, for-profit labor
dispatch agencies are rapidly arising to meet the demand of firms seeking to hire Chinese
workers both domestically and internationally).
50. See CHEN, Supra note 42, at 30 32 (summarizing the origins and evolution of labor
dispatch agencies from the 1980s through the 2000s); Labor Dispatch Systein inReforn, supra
note 49 (describing the original objectives of these agencies when they first emerged in the
1980s).
51. See Labor Dispatch System inReform, supra note 49 (stating that in 2005, three
years after SOE and private companies began to use labor dispatch agencies, 26,158 such
agencies operated in China); Xu,supra note 49, at 434 35 (describing how dispatch agencies
evolved to accommodate the changing needs of Chinese enterprises).
52. See Labor Dispatch Sj stein in Reforn, supra note 49 (detailing how individuals sign
contracts with agencies, which then place workers with employers); Xu supra note 49, at 431
(describing the mechanics of how labor dispatch agencies recruit and place workers).
53. See PARK, supra note 9, at 6 (stating that workers increasingly utilize dispatch
agencies to obtain employment in Africa); Xu, supra note 49, at 432, 434 (describing labor
agencies as transnational operations and noting that "domestic and foreign firms increasingly
consider using labor dispatch companies").
54. See Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that most contract workers in Africa obtain
employment through labor dispatch agencies): see also, e.g..
MICIL & BELrRET, supra note 5,
at 71-78 (recounting visits to staffing agencies in Central China and Chongqing wvherein
managers forecast growing demand from enterprises operating inAfrica).
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B. The Chinese Worker Experience in Africa
Although limited statistical data is available on Africa's Chinese
workforce, reports indicate that the size and composition of this
population varies by country and industry. 55 As such, the relationship
Chinese employers maintain with their Chinese employees is largely
determined by a workerfs rank and skill-level, local regulatory and
economic conditions, and whether the employer is an SOE or private
enterprise. 6 Managers and overseers of Chinese projects in Africa are
usually Chinese nationals. 5 7 This tends to be true across industries,
from mining and oil to construction and manufacturing.
As local heads of enterprise, managers are often hired directly by
their employers, either as permanent employees or for fixed terms."
Because of the necessary experience and high demands placed on
them, these individuals tend to draw higher wages than they would at
55. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4. at 156 (reporting that "the ratio of Chinese workers
to locals varies enormously, depending on how long a Chinese company has been working in a
country, how easy it is to find skilled workers locally, and the local governnent's policies on
work permits"); see also BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 255 (noting similar factors play a role in
the movement of workers in Africa).
56. See BROADMAN, supra note 8, at 222 23 (citing local labor shortages, corruption,
and weak regulation as factors that influence the employment relationship between Chinese
firms and their workers). See generally Brautigam, supra note 8 (discussing local conditions
that typically influence Chinese firms' recruiting practices in Africa).
57. See Lee, supra note 6, at 652 (stating that supervisors of Chinese projects are almost
always Chinese nationals); Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 13, at 14 (observing that Chinese
firms hire Africans for basic tasks and import Chinese managers for higher-paying positions);
see also, e.g., MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 215 (summarizing numerous visits to
Chinese enterprises and housing compounds where managers and supervisors are consistently
Chinese nationals); Thulani Guliwe & Skmnbuzo Mkionta, Chinese Investments in South
Africa, in CHINESE INVESTMENTS FNAFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 300,
323 (documenting that all fifteen supervisors at a textile factory in South Africa are Chinese
expatriates).
58. See Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 13, at 14 (stating that Chinese companies import
Chinese managers and supervisors for higher paid positions); see also, e.g., BROADMAN, supra
note 12, at 224 (observing that a Chinese firm in Senegal has had no success hiring local
managers); Lee, supra note 6, at 651 (reporting that Chinese expatriates occupy the major
managerial and technical positions at China Non-Ferrous Metal Industries Corporation in
Zambia).
59. See Thulani Guliwe, An Introduction to Chinese-African Relations, in CHINESE
INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA: A LABOUR PERSPECTIVE, supra note 6, at 16, 33 (stating that

Chinese enterprises tend to hire local workers for low-skilled projects, but not necessarily for
executive and management positions): see also PARK, supra note 9, at 6 (explaining that a
small number of Chinese p.rofessionals immigrate to Africa via direct government-togovernment agreements); see also, e.g., Lee, supra note 6. at 652, 655-56 (documenting
Chinese managers sent to Africa by their enployers in China and the eight- and nine-year
tenures of some mangers )
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home in China.6" Likewise, engineers, technicians, and other workers
possessing specialized skills sign similar contracts.6 1 Although they
also report receiving higher salaries than they would for comparable
jobs in mainland China, many are paid a fraction of what European
companies pay local professionals.12 While some companies try to
hire local technicians when possible, Chinese nationals still tend to
fill out the ranks in technical positions.6 3
Semiskilled and unskilled laborers are typically recruited from
among China's large migrant population and the urban unemployed.6 4
Decisions about whether to import Chinese labor depends upon the
needs of the employer and local conditions, such as the available
supply of experienced workers, language capacity, and political
stability.15 No employer has ever been reported to source staff entirely
from mainland China.66 Where a project demands even minimal skill
or experience, however, Chinese companies rely heavily on Chinese

60. See PARK,supra note 9, at 9 (reporting that wages in Africa can be 30% to 400%
higher than in China); see also MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 72 73 (providing
anecdotes on workers' increased African wages).
61. See MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7. at 13, 16 (indicating a significant increase in
Chinese construction and engineering projects, which has contributed to a growth in short-term
labor contracts); PARK, supra note 9, at 6 (documenting a class of construction, financial,
telecommunications, and media professionals that typically sign one to three year contracts).
62. See PARK, supra note 9,at I I (quoting a researcher who says Chinese workers "are
paid much less .. than Western expats doing comparable work'): Guliwe, supra note 59, at
33 (noting that engineers are paid one-sixth wliat European companies pay).
63. See BRAUTIGAM, supra note 4, at 154 58 (asserting that employment of skilled
Chinese tecimicians varies widely throughout Africa, but Chinese firms still frequently staff
these positions with their own nationals); see, e.g., BROADMAN, supra note 8. at 224
(acknowledging that the shortage of engineers and other technical workers in South Africa
makes it difficult for Chinese enterprises to hire locally); Lee, supra note 6, at 651-52
(reporting that Chinese nationals fill all major managerial and technical positions in Zambia's
Chambishi mine and Tanzania's Urafiki textile mills).
64. See MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 72 74 (documenting the recruitment of
Chinese factory workers for positions in Africa and calling them "symbols of a whole
generation of Chinese ... [who] are to [work] in unknowi ... countries"); Liou, supra note
25, at 152-53 (noting that to mitigate domestic unemployment, the PRC commonly sends
workers overseas), see also MOHAN & KALE supra note 7, at 3 (noting that Chinese workers
are brought to Africa because they, inter alia, "soak[] up unemployment inChina").
65. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text (explaining the primary reasons why
Chinese firms choose to hire Chinese nationals).
66. See Brautigam, supra note 8 (stating that there has yet to be a report of a Chinese
firm hiring an entirely Chinese workforce); see also Guliwe, supra note 59, at 32 (observing
that in most projects, locals may comprise up to eighty-five to iinety-five percent of the

w orkforce).
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laborers.6 7 Typically hired for a fixed term for anywhere from one to
three years, general laborers, like their skilled counterparts, are
required to remain in the country for the duration of their
employment, or are offered large bonuses to forego time off and
return visits home.6 8
Although wages for Chinese general laborers tend to be higher
than the wages they would earn in their home country, workers
usually see only a small fraction of them. 69 It is common practice for
employers to give workers only a small stipend and deposit the
remainder of their wages directly into Chinese bank accounts. ° As a
result, Chinese laborers live simply, usually in small company-run
enclaves, isolated from the local community. 71 Further, Chinese law
requires employers to sign work contracts with these laborers.7 2 While
studies show that the majority of migrant laborers in Africa sign

67. See MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7. at 3 (naming cost reduction, enhancement of
labor flexibility, and alleviation of unemployment at home as key reasons why firms bring
over Chinese workers): Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that throughout the forty-nine African
countries where they operate, Chinese infrastructure, public works, oil, and mining operations
rely heavily on Chinese migrant labor).
68. See PARK, supra note 9, at 6 (reporting that most workers remain in Africa for the
full term of their contracts, which are usually one to three years long); Politzer, supra note 7
(documenting that migrants generally complete their contracts before returning to China); see
also, e.g., MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 72 (describing a contract where salary doubles
if a worker waives his one-month home leave).
69. See Guliwe, supra note 59, at 32 33 (citing a study that found that Chinese
companies often provide workers a daily stipend of US$1, which means they live below the
poverty line); Lee, supra note 6. at 653 (quoting managers wvho explain that the Chinese staff
do not get paid in-country).
70. See Lee, supra note 6, at 653-54 (stating that wages are commonly deposited directly
into Chinese bank accounts so that families may access the funds); see also PARK, supra note
9, at 9 (describing the intention of many Chinese contract workers to come to Africa, live
frugally and save money to achieve their financial goals upon their return home): see, e.g.,
MICHEL & BEURET supra note 5. at 28 (telling the story of a Chinese worker whose African
wages will be deposited into a special account in his hometown bank).
71. See Guliwe, supra note 59, at 32-33 (citing a study that found that Chinese
companies often provide housing for their workers); Lee, supra note 6. at 653-54 (describing
two company-owned compounds built outside of the local city centers, guarded by security
personnel); Politzer, supra note 7 (documenting the spare conditions of migrant housing in
Africa).
72. Jiuye Cujin Fa [Employment Promotion Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Jan. 1. 2008) art. 31 (China); see BROWN, supra
note 46. at 30-31 (explainig that China's 2008 Employment Promotion Law requires
employers to maintain contracts with migrant workers); Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring
Progress Under China"s Labor Law: Goals. Processes.Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y
J. 373, 380-82 (2008) (explaining that Chinese labor laws require contracts for most types of
employment relationships, including migrant worker aarangements).
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agreements with labor dispatch agencies, it is unclear exactly how
many laborers form contracts directly with employers. 3
Despite the fact that labor contracts and legislation, as discussed
below, are designed to regulate Chinese employers and the treatment
of their employees, this is commonly not the case. 74 Outcry over
China's labor practices in Africa has become increasingly
widespread, and consistently focuses on the plight of local African
workers. 7 Moreover, limited information is available from the
Chinese worker perspective. 6 Detailed accounts of China's migrant
laborers, where they exist, however, often reveal that unskilled and
semiskilled employees are treated much the same as their local
counterparts. 7 Chinese factory workers throughout Africa have
reported being forced to work excessively long hours-up to twelve
to sixteen hours a day, seven days a week-without overtime pay.

73. See BROADLAN. supra note 8, at 99 (concluding that both African and Chinese
actors lack key information on investment and employment requirements in Africa); MOHAN
& KALE, supra note 7, at 19 (stating that know ledge gaps exist in the number of Chinese
migrants traveling to Africa and firms' practices of hiring Chinese workers) see also, e.g.,
Politzer, supra note 7 (noting simply that "the majority of temporary migrants" use labor
dispatch agencies to obtain work in Africa).
74. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1050-51 (cataloguing the many ways Chinese law
fails to protect workers or regulate work environments); Josephs, supra note 72, at 374 75
(charging that, although China's written labor law is relatively developed, local governments
are unwilling to implement necessary protections).
75. See, e.g., HIUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2 (examining, in depth, the abuse of
Zambian miners at Chinese-owned copper mines); Lee, supra note 6, at 665 (stating that
accounts of Chinese projects in Africa rarely document the experience of Chinese workers);
Lusaka, supra note 5, at 21 (documenting worker mistreatment at Chinese-owned mines and
factories).
76. See Sasha Gong, Chinese Workers in Africa: Wlorking Conditions and Potential
Conflicts (UCLA African Studies Ctr., Working Paper, 2007) (observing that, "the vast
number of Chinese migrant workers in [Africa] rarely attracts attention"); see also, MOHAN &
KALE, supra note 7. at 4-6. 19 (calling for more research on China's Diaspora in Africa,
Chinese labor migrants, and labor relations within factories); Brautigam, supra note 8
(undertaking, as a result of wide misconceptions about the nature of China's imported worker
population in Africa, to collect information about this group "where it exists").
77. See MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 71 94 (documenting the general safety,
security. working, and living conditions of Chinese nationals in Nigeria and Algeria): Gong,
supra note 76 (documenting the poor living conditions of Chinese migrants throughout
Africa).
78. See Brook Larmer, "We Were... Like Slaves," NEWSWEEK, Aug. 12, 2002, at 23
(reporting factory conditions that allegedly caused the deaths of two Chinese nationals in
Mauritius), Grace Ng, Into the Great Unknoin, STRAITS IMES (Sing.), Aug. 20, 2011,
Saturday Special Report, available at LEXIS (reporting excessive overtime, underpayment,
and, generally, other "harsh conditions" Chinese workers in South Africa experience in
Chinese firms).
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While firms usually provide local housing, accommodations are often
dirty, cramped, and heavily monitored to ensure nationals do not
wander far from the work site.7 9 In some cases, firms have been
known to retain passports to prevent runaways. 80
Further, news headlines and anecdotes suggest that Chinese
firms fail to take adequate precautions to protect workers from local
dangers. 81 The presence of Chinese workers in Africa received
perhaps the greatest attention when news agencies worldwide
reported on two separate kidnappings of Chinese in Ethiopia and
Nigeria. 12 While these high-profile abductions at least compelled
Chinese officials and firms to openly discuss security concerns in
Africa, they remain a threat.8 3 Most recently, in April 2011, regime
change in Libya forced 12,000 Chinese citizens to flee the country,

79. See MICHEL & BEUiRET, supra note 5,at88 (describing the spartan accommodations
in Chinese company housing); Gong, supra note 76 (reporting that Chinese workers often
complain about the living conditions in company housing, notably the strict rules and
curfews); Ng,supra note 78 (documenting the experience of two Chinese expatriates who
were forced to sleep on a factory floor and in cramped hostels).
80. See Ng, supra note 78 (reporting the practice by Chinese oil companies in Nigeria of
obtaining passports to prevent migrants from overstaying their contracts or moving on to settle
in other countries).
81. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey Gettleman, Rebels Storm a Chinese-Run Oil Field in Ethiopia,
Killing 70, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, atA6 (chronicling a 2007 rebel attack and kidnapping
at a Chinese project in Ethiopia); Royston Chan & Tom Miles, China Evacuates 12,000 from
Libya.
Sends
Frigate
to
Help,
REUTERS,
Feb.
25,
2011,
http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFTOE71000420110225 (reporting on the plight of
Chinese workers wlho evacuated Libya during the 2011 rebel uprising).
82. See Gettleman, supra note 81, at A6 (stating that the attack by Ethiopian rebels was
motivated by the alleged exploitation, by China, of Ethiopia's mineral resources); Le Tian,
Ethiopia Tragedy Raises Safey
Fears, CHINA
DAILY, Apr.
26, 2007,
http://www.chinadaily.comn.c/hina12007-04/26/content-860262.htm (reporting on separatist
rebels that stormed an Ethiopian oil field and abducted six Chinese nationals), see also
MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 75 77 (documenting the kidnapping of two workers in
Nigeria and attempting to interview members of the men's village in China); Released Chinese
iforkers Back Home ftom Nigeria, XINHIUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 22, 2007,
http:/news.xinhuanet.com/englisli/2007-01/22/content 5636706.htm
(reporting
on
the
kidnapping, by guerrillas, of two Sichuan men employed by a Chinese telecommunications
company to install telephone cables inNigeria).
83. See China Evaluates Safety After Ethiopia Killings, CHPNA DAiLY. Apr. 26, 2007,
http://www.chinadaily'.comn.i/chiiia2007-04/26/content 861069.htm
(summarizing
PRC
government efforts to openly address security concerns at worksites inAfrica); see also PARK,
supra note 9, at 10, 11 (stating that Ethiopian and Sudanese rebel groups profess anti-China
views because of the PRC's ties to state officials and noting, in general, that Chinese can be

more ,ulnerable to xenophobia-motivated crimes).
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but not before several workers were reportedly stranded temporarily,
robbed, or otherwise injured.84
But even in stable areas where insecurity and violence do not
pose a risk, commonplace safety hazards remain. Landmines litter
many of the postconflict areas where Chinese firms work on
infrastructure projects, and malaria plagues nearly all of sub-Saharan
Africa. 85 While Chinese nationals have been killed or critically
incapacitated by both, Chinese firms and diplomats generally react to
such incidents with indifference. 6
C. South Aftica's Unique Relationshipwith China
As one of the continent's most developed and democratic
nations, South Africa's relationship with China tells a somewhat
unique story. 87 On January 1, 1998, South Africa officially
84. See Chan & Miles, supra note 81 (reporting on the plight of Chinese workers who
evacuated Libya); Leslie Hook & Geoff Dyer, Chinese Oil Interests Attacked in Libya, FIN.
TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 24, 2011,
http://w w.ft.com/cmsls/O,eef58d52-3fe2-I1eO-81If00144feabdc0.html#axzzlvBPKalcH (speculating that the evacuation of approximately 30,000
workers from Libya may be the largest overseas evacuation China has attempted).
85. See MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 72, 222 23 (citing the "ubiquitous risk of
malaria" and reporting the death of a Chinese worker w1io stepped on a landmine while
digging a trench in Angola, and noting that "[t]his wasn't the first time something like this had
happened"); see also Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 12, at 40, 50 (summarizing aspects of
Chinese aid to Africa. including the donation of antimalarial drugs and malaria clinics); see
also, e.g., Guliwe, supra note 59, at 25 (noting that China, a significant a s exporter to
Africa, has not signed the Ottawa Declaration on Landmines); Austin C. Muneku, Chinese
Investments in Zambia, in CHINESE INVESTMIENTS IN AFRICA: A LABOLR PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 6, at 160, 183 (describing a Chinese firm's failure to conduct antimalaria spraying to
protect employees).
86. See MICHEL & BELRET, supra note 5. at 222-23 (quoting a Norwegian mine
clearance worker and a Chinese diplomat who confirmed corporate and official indifference to
mine safety): see also Au Yiu Kai, Chinese Illegal Workers in Liberia, MEDECINS SANS
FRONTIERES BLOC (Mar. 15, 2006). http://www.msf.org.hkblogs/index.php/paul au/296/
?lang=en (recounting her treatment of four Chinese workers who contracted malaria and
musing that "there would be more to come").
87. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 300 (cataloguing the many factors that
contribute to South Africa's status as one of China's strategic partners, including several high
level exchanges, diplomatic declarations, and a free trade agreement, as well as their recent
history): see also PARK, supra note 9. at 13 (declaring that because South Africa is the only
African nation home to a sizable population of ethnic Chinese citizens, the country "is worth
separate consideration"); see also, e.g., Thomas Orr, Mandela, Diamonds and Crime: The
South Africa-China Relationship at a Crossroads, 29 CHINA MONITOR 4. 4-5, 8-9 (2008)
(highlighting prominent elements of the China-South Africa relationship, including China's
support of South Africa's anti-apartheid movement, an economic relationship that
corresponded with both countries' global emergence, and South Africa's role as a historic
destination ofthe Chinese Diaspora).
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established diplomatic ties with the communist PRC, a long-time
supporter of its liberation struggle 8 8 Both politics and economics
motivated the decision." 9 As the PRC only maintains diplomatic
relations with countries that adhere to the One China Policy, the move
required South Africa to cease its recognition of Taiwan, one of the
apartheid regime s strongest allies. 90 Moreover, in a rapidly
globalizing world, the two developing nations viewed expanded
relations as a wise strategy for economic growth. 91 Indeed, in the last
twenty years, bilateral trade has surged and the PRC continues to
regard South Africa as an important partner in its own right, but also
as the critical gateway to the rest of the continent.2

88. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 301 (stating that South Africa's
recognition of the PRC and derecognition of Taiwan officially took effect on January 1, 1998);
Orr supra note 87, at 4 (recording the official establishment of Chinese-South African
relations as January 1, 1998, and recounting recent China-South Aftica history).
89. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 302 (citing South Africa's goal of playing
a bigger role in international affairs, its desire to conduct bilateral trade with the PRC, and the
limited trade opportunities with Taiwan as reasons it decided to de-recognize Taiwan in favor
of the PRC); see also Orr, supra note 87, at 4-5 (stating that strong historical solidarity
motivated diplomatic ties and that the two nations' successful relationship coincides with their
respective emergence into the global mainstream economy).
90. See BRAUTIGM., supra note 4, at 3 (noting that critics condemn China's general
policy of mutual recognition of any state that officially recognizes the PRC); Guliwe &
Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 301 (stating that because Taiwan was an "international pariah' like
South Africa, it was willing to eschew international sanctions and engage apartheid South
Africa "at the highest level"); see also Gulive & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 301 02
(explaining that the "One China Policy" promulgated by the PRC government states that there
is one legitimate Chinese government and Taiwan is a part of mainland China); Joint
Communique Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, I
(Aug. 17, 1982). reprinted in 21 EL.M. 1147. 1147 (setting forth the United States' policy of
recognition of the PRC, which adheres to the "One China Policy").
91. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 302 (arguing that "urgent economic
concerns" and future trade and investment objectives motivated Nelson Mandela's decision to
establish diplomatic ties with the PRC): Orr, supra note 87, at 5 (stating that China's recent
wave of investments in South Africa represent more diversified and sustainable attempts for
long term success).
92. In 1991 bilateral trade between China and South Africa stood at US$14 million. See
Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 303. In 2010, trade with South Africa accounted for
approximately fifteen percent, or US$18 billion, of total Sino-Aflican trade. Launiching Pad:
Chinese Firms Have Stumbled Before in South Africa, but the Country's Gateway Position
Keeps
Drawing
[iem
Back,
CHINA
ECON.
REV.,
Mar.
I
2011,
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/content/launching-pad [hereinafter Launching Pad]
(identifying South Africa's strategic economic role in the region as a primary reason for
China's continued attempts at establishing businesses there)- see BROADMAN, supra note 8, at
255 (calling South Africa a "predominant platform" for multinationals seeking to expand
throughout sub-Saharan Africa), Richard Bowker, Dancinig with the Dragon. Economic
Relaions Betwieen South 4fi-ica and China, TRADEINVESTSA, (July 25, 2008, 12:18 PM),
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Since formalizing relations, over eighty Chinese firms have
established operations in South Africa.93 These firms represent a wide
range of industries including energy, mining and metallurgy,
electronics, telecommunications, commercial banking, shipping, light
manufacturing, and automobiles.94 In the years leading up to the 2010
FIFA World Cup, business surged for Chinese construction
companies, which are known to hire some of the highest percentages
of their own nationals. 95 Outside the country's thriving urban centers,
smaller, independently-owned factories have established a substantial
foothold in textile and clothing manufacturing.9 6
Despite their seemingly symbiotic economic relationship,
Chinese companies face challenges in South Africa. 97 Across firms
and industries, two issues predominate. First, South Africa hosts a
significant number of domestic and international companies that are
already well-established in the same industries in which Chinese
firms are seeking to compete.9" Second, South Africa*s robust worker
http://www.tradeiinvestsa.co.za/news/687543.htm (referring to South Africa as a gateway for
China to access the rest of Africa).
93. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 311 (establishing that since 1998 over
eighty Chinese companies have settled in South Africa, the majority representing SOE
subsidiaries): see also Yaw Baah & Jauch, supra note 13, at 35 (stating that of the 800 Chinese
companies operating in Africa, South Africa attracts the largest share).
94. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 313-16 (naming the major construction,
financial. electronics. manufacturing, transportation, mining, and retail firms in South Africa
and describing the nature of their investments); Launching Pad, supra note 92, at 2 3 (listing
the most prevalent Chinese industries in South Africa).
95. See BROAD.MAN, supra note 8, at 224, 280-81 (calling the construction industry one
of the largest employers of Chinese workers in South Africa); see also Guliwe & Mkhonta,
supra note 57, at 313 (noting that in 2008 there was a growing presence of Chinese
construction companies in South Africa); Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that Chinese
construction workers comprise about thirty percent of the total worker population in Africa,
and that this number is increasing).
96. See Geoffi'ey York, In South Africa, Jobs that Come at a Price, GLOBE & MVIAIL
(Can.), Dec. 8, 2010, at A 19 (claiming that the story of one particular Chinese factory owner in
South Africa's rural north is representative of dozens of Chinese entrepreneurs in the region):
see also PARK, supra note 9. at 8 (describing small, independently-owned Chinese businesses,
such as retail shops, wholesalers, and factories, that are emerging throughout South Africa).
97. See Orr, supra note 87, at 4 (noting the China has been more successful than South
Africa in taking advantage of their bilateral relationship); see also Launching Pad, supra note
92 (stating that extensive regulation and sophisticated competitors have frustrated the
objectives of many Chinese companies in South Africa).
98. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 311-13 (calling South Africa a
ksophisticated market in its own right" and using the example of South Africa's "highly
developed and sophisticated financial sector" as an example of an industry where existing
South African firms may have a competitive advantage over newly entering Chinese firms);
see also Launching Pad, supra note 92, at 1 2 (naming construction, mining, textiles,
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protections and historically strong labor movement present a steep
learning curve to Chinese enterprises generally accustomed to
operating in the shadows of regulatory compliance. 9 9 Rather than
invest the resources to compete in South Africa's more open markets
and submit to government oversight, most firms have instead
retreated to other African nations where both competition and
governance are weak."
According to local workers and business owners, however,
Chinese enterprises still maintain a strong upper hand.0l' Complaints
abound that Chinese employers routinely pay workers below the
prescribed minimum wage.O°1 Because unemployment holds steady at
an astonishing sixty percent in many parts of the country, many South
Africans report that they have no choice but to accept low-paying jobs
with Chinese firms. 103 Also widespread are reports that workers

automobiles, and banking as just some of the Chinese businesses attempting to enter an
already well-established South African market).
99. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 311 (enumerating South Africa's strong
local industries and rigorous regulations and investment codes as two structural factors that in
the past pushed China to explore other markets); see also Launching Pad,supra note 92, at 1
2 (stating that strict labor and financial regulations slow the investment process and push
Chinese investors to adapt their business practices).
100. See MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7, at 12 13; see (Iso Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra
note 57. at 311 (stating that when firms initially encountered South Africa's robust regulator)
systems, many chose to move on to less regulated countries): LaUichirg Pad,supra note 92, at
1 2 (concluding that strict regulations have even caused a significant number of Chinese
enterprises to withdraw from South Africa).
101. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 308-11 (describing, generally, how South
Africa's strong labor laws and China's trade policy combine to disadvantage local workers);
see also Orr, supra note 87, at 9 (explaining that as a result of China's rising visibility in South
Africa, locals increasingly blame the PRC for unemployment and general economic
disenfranchisement)- York, supra note 96, at AI9 (suggesting that in the wake of high
unemploy ment, many South Africans face a dilemma between accepting an illegally low
paying Chinese job or no job at all).
102. See York, supra note 96, at A19 (describing the practices of dozens of Chinese
textile factories in South Africa that chronically undercut the legal minimum wage); Susan
Stelzner, Labor and Einployinent Law in South Africa, in II PHILIP M. BERKOWITZ, ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 221, 224 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining that
South Africa does not have a nationwide minimum wage, but rather, determines wages
according to sector, employment category, and geographical area).
103. See York, suprw note 96, at AI9 (reporting a sixty percent unemployment rate
throughout rural areas where many Chinese firms operate and explaining that, as a result,
workers feel coerced into accepting underpaying Chinese jobs); see also Guliwe & Mikdonta,
supw note 57, at 309 (eluding, generally, to South Africa's severe unemployment problem).
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receive few, if any, benefits or skills training, and attempts to
unionize are met with hostility. 1 4
Chinese workers commonly endure similar conditions at the
hands of their managers and fellow Chinese nationals in Africa.10 5
Since 1998, South Africa has become an increasing popular
destination for China's diaspora, hosting an estimated 100,000 to
300,000 legal and illegal mainland immigrants. 106 While a
considerable number go into work for themselves as traders and
shopkeepers, many have been recruited by large enterprises to work
in a capacity equivalent to the local population.' 0 7 They represent a
smaller part of the workforce but maintain a significant presence in
Chinese companies. '08 Language barriers and rising anti-Chinese
sentiment limit channels for these foreign workers to seek redress.10 9

104. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 320 29 (interviewing several South
African workers wvho report no opportunities for on-the-job skills training and strong resistance
to unionization); Ng, supra note 9 (summarizing the most common complaints voiced by
South African employees at Chinese enterprises).
105. See Larmer, supra note 78, at 23 (reporting on the poor conditions and long hours
Chinese workers endure at textile factories in Mauritius); Ng, supra note 78 (documenting
abusive practices Chinese nationals have faced working for Chinese employers in South
Africa).
106. See MOHAN & KALE, supra note 7, at 2 (citing South Africa as one of the primary
destinations of the original Chinese diaspora in Africa, now hosting between 100,000 to
300,000 immigrants, and that subsequent migration waves have built upon this earlier pattern);
Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 315 (documenting the recent influx of Chinese migrants
to South Africa and the competitive pressures it has placed on local business). See generally
Immigrant Workers Need to be Protected, CAPE TIMES (S. Afr.), Apr. 22, 2008, at 10
[hereinafter Immigrant Jlorkers]; Wabo Dieudonne Cottie, Emerging Jurisprudence on the
Labour Law Protectionsfor Undocumented Migrant Workers in South Africa: Lessons for
Countries (15th Int'l Lab. & Emp. Rel. Ass'n World Cong., Track 3: Work, Family,
Community, 2009) (discussing, generally, issues surrounding illegal immigrants in South
Africa).
107. See BROADA-N, supra note 8, at 224 (explaining that the labor shortage in South
Africa compels some Chinese firms to import their workforce from China); PARK, supra note
9, at 7-8 (discussing the experience of Chinese nationals recruited from Fujian to work in
South African enterprises).
108. See Guliwe & Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 313, 315, 323, 325, 328 329 (describing
the impacts Chinese labor has had on construction, retail, and textile enterprises) see also Ng.
supra note 9. at 3-4 (stating that Chinese migrants constitute a growing population in South
Africa, which is beginning to both make significant contributions and place pressure on the
economy).
109. See Lee, supra note 6. at 654 (identifying an inability to speak local languages and
limited knowledge of English as significant influences on the Chinese reluctance to engage
with the local community): Gong, supra note 76 (stating that resentment towards the Chinese
is increasingly visible); see also Liou, supra note 25, at 181 (concluding that hostility towards
Chinese has not lessened).
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II.
LEGAL MUECHAVISM4S THAT PROTECT CHJ-VESE WORKERS
IN AFRICA
Given that Chinese workers in Africa are vulnerable to excessive
overtime, underpayment, and unsafe and insecure conditions, Part II
examines the laws designed to protect them. Section A assesses the
international law protections that are available to China's
international worker population. Section B analyzes China's
employment laws and their applicability to workers in Africa. As a
result of the dearth of information on this group, this Section assesses
the effectiveness of these laws within the context of their success in
protecting domestic migrant workers. Finally, Section C explores
South Africa's labor system and the protections it may extend to
Chinese nationals.
A. Worker ProtectionsProvided by InternationalLaw
When transnational labor issues assume a human rights focus,
lawyers and advocates usually invoke the International Labor
Organization ("ILO") and its prodigious body of conventions."° An
agency operating under the United Nations, the ILO develops and
monitors international labor standards, targeting a vast array of
different subjects and groups. " Migrant workers are in particular
need of international legal safeguards as they are "uniquely
impervious" to the protections of domestic laws.' 2 Ultimately, the
ILO offers limited refuge to Chinese workers in Africa, as its general
enforcement powers are weak." 3 Adherence to ILO standards often
comes down to each nation making a commitment to enact and
110. See Database of' International Labour Standards, INT'L LAB. ORG,
http:,,www.ilo.org/ilolex/englisli/convdispl.htm (last visited Apr. 9. 2012) (indicating that
since its founding in 1919, the ILO has passed 189 conventions).
III.See About the ILO, INTL LAB. ORG., http:/wvN-w.ilo.org/globaliabout-the-ilo/lang-eiindex.htm (last visited Jan. 9. 2012) (describing the agency's objective to develop and
enforce standards in,inter alia, decent work, gender equality, and social security).
112. See Sarah IT.Cleveland, JWhv InternationalLabor Standards", in INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 129, 144 (Robert J.
Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003) (stating that migrant workers are uniquely
impervious to protections afforded by domestic laws); see also Cooney, supra note 47, at1054
(explaining that migrant workers in China are often treated worse than permanent workers).
113. See
STEPHEN F. DIAMOND,
FROM "CHE" TO CHINA: LABOR AND
AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 66-67 (2009) (stating that in the

absence of government legislation, ILO conventions do "not form the basis of a cause of action
in any jurisdiction"). See generallyILO FRAMEWORK,supra note 10 (setting forth nonbinding
principles to guide individual states inproviding greater protections to migrant workers).
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enforce corresponding domestic regulations. 1 4 And while Africa's
more democratic republics have taken steps to establish national
11 5
standards, most are unable or unwilling to effectively enforce them.
A lack of capacity, fear of alienating transnational corporations. and
urgent public health, economic, and security issues push labor low on
the priority list.1 16
Even these minimal state undertakings represent an increasingly
elusive goal for the ILO, as a decreasing number of nations continue
to sign on to its instruments. 17 Notably, China, South Africa, and a
significant majority of African nations have neglected to ratify the
1975 Migrant Workers Convention, which promotes equality and the
prevention of abuse in migrant labor populations.'8 Further, China
and South Africa have thus far abstained from signing the United
Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
114. See DIAMOND, supra note 113, at 66 (explaining how enforceability remains a
major weakness of ILO standards) Tzehainesh Tekl, LabourLaw and Worker Protection in
the South: An Evolving Tension Bet iveen Models and Reality, in LABOUR LAW AND WORKER
PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3, 32 36 (Tzehainesh Tekl

ed., 2010) (noting that

international labor standards are often violated because nations fail to enforce internal laws in
the face of economic and political pressures).
115. See Fenwick et al., supra note 14, at 183-94 (concluding that although ILO
standards have helped southern African states achieve threshold labor standards, several
factors, such as poverty, AIDS epidemic, and increasing labor migration, pose significant
challenges to enforcement): see also Nongovernmental OrganizationsandAcademics: Edward
Webster, in MONITORING
INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS:
INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES; SUMMARY OF REGIONAL FORUMS 85, 85 (Crispin Rigby ed., 2004)
[hereinafter MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS] (noting that in South Africa,

ratification of ILO Conventions is 'merely rhetoric" as illustrated by its many violations, and
that judges in the region are interested in enforcing standards, but lack the capacity to
effectively do so).
116. See Ulrich Flechsenhar, ILO Southern Africa Multidisciplinar Advisory Team, in
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 115, at 8, 8 9 (explaining that

1I1V/AIDS, Africa's "towering" debt burden, and political instability have "complicated
adherence to the provisions of the ILO Declaration"), Nongovernmental Organizations and
Acadenics: Edward Wfebster, supra note 115, at 85 86 (describing some critics' belief that
enforcing labor standards disadvantages developing countries who urgently need investment);
Tekle, supra note 114, at 4 (noting that most states are afraid that regulating labor will result in
the loss of foreign investment from transnational corporations).
117. See Cleveland. supra note 112, at 171 n.114 (noting that the major ILO conventions
specifically designed to protect the rights of migrant workers have very low ratification
levels); see also BRIAN LANGILLE, PUB. LECTURE OF THE INTL INST. FOR LABOUR STUDIES,

WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW FOR? 14 (2005) (observing a general "ratification
crisis" at the ILO in recent years).
118. See Database qf International Labour Standards, supra note 110 (indicating that,
among others, China has not ratified Convention No. 87: Freedom of Association and
Protection of the right to Organize and Convention No. 98: Right to Organize and Collective

Bargaining and Convention No. 143).
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All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which sets
forth binding standards for governing and enforcing migrant labor
protection." 9 While these conventions may not be effective without
strong domestic support, the failure of China and its African partners
to sign them reflects their reluctance to make
a gesture of symbolic
2
support towards evolving labor standards.
As international labor law, in its current state, is ill-equipped to
enforce the rights of overseas workers, domestic laws provide the
primary source of protection to Chinese workers in Africa. 121
Particularly important is employment contract law, which is the
foundation for most international employment disputes. 122 Because
they establish their employment relationships before going overseas,
Chinese law governs most disputes between employers and their
expatriate employees that arise in contract. 123 But, as local
employment laws typically will supersede less-protective foreign
laws, the domestic laws of African host nations may apply in
situations that are not governed by contract, or in situations where
local law requires greater protections than those guaranteed by
124
contract.
119. Status of Treaties: InternationalConvention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant R-orkers and Afembers of Their Families, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
httD:/itreaties.un.or,/D~uaZes/ViewDetails.aspx'src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV- I3&chapter
4&lang en (last visited Apr. 9. 2012) (indicating that neither China nor South Africa are
signatories to the treaty).
120. See, e.g, BROWN, supra note 46, at 86-88 (finding that despite China's ratification
of several key international social and labor conventions, discrimination against migrants
occurs); Josephs, supra note 72, at 377 nn.20-21 (enumerating the key ILO conventions China
has not signed and asserting that despite its signing status, China is bound, as a member of the
ILO governing board, to certain fundamental declarations whether they follow them or not).
121. See supra notes 113 20 and accompanying text (summarizing the general
inadequacies of international labor law).
122. See LANGRLE, supra note 117, at 5, 8 (stating that the starting point of analyzing
international labor standards is understanding domestic contract law, which governs the
formation of employment relationships); Jack A. Raisner, Representing the Employee Work-ing
Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL EMAPLOYAENT LAW: Tim IULTINATiONAL EMflPLOxER AND THE
GLOBAL WORKFORCE 37, 52 (Dennis Campbell et al. eds., 1999) (explaining that only with
great difficulty may a worker successfully argue that domestic contract law governing his
employment should not be applied).
123. See Xu, supra note 49, at 431 (stating that Chinese workers sign Chinese labor
contracts either with their employers, or with agencies that place workers with employers);
Labor Dispatch System in Reform, supra note 49; see also LANGRLE, supra note 117, at 5, 8
(explaining that at the foundation of most international labor disputes is the contract law of a
worker's nation of origin).
124. See Raisner, supra note 122, at 52 (stating that more protective domestic labor laws
will preempt the conflicting, less-protective laws of the contract's nation of origin); see also
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B. ProtectionsProvided by China'sEmployment Laws
The framework of Chinese labor law is shaped by three primary
laws: the 1994 Labor Law, the 2008 Labor Contract Law ("LCL"),
and the 2008 Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes
("LMALD"). 125 This Section first discusses the 1994 Labor Law as
the root of China's modern contract-based employment system and
the key areas expanded by the LCL. It then summarizes relevant
provisions of the LMALD and assesses its effectiveness in providing
redress to migrant workers. Finally, this Section highlights several
scholarly recommendations to improve enforcement of these laws.
1. China*s Labor and Labor Contract Laws
Although a source of heavy criticism, the PRC is making
progress in providing better legal protections and enforcement
mechanism to workers.126 The foundation of Chinese employment law
is the 1994 Labor Law, which codifies the PRC employment contract
system. 127 It represents the country's first steps to restructure the legal
status of employees in light of the socialist market reforms that would
reshape SOEs and the economy as a whole. 1 The law governs all

LANGILLE, supra note 117, at 5 6 (explaining that domestic laws may govern international
employment relationships that arise in tort or human rights).
125. See, e.g.,
BROWN, supra note 46, at 16 (referring to the 1994 Labor Law as China's
"primary labor law"); Josephs, supra note 72, at 379 (describing the 2008 Labor Contract Law
("LCL")as "arguably the most important development since 1994"); Yun Zhao, China's .ew
Labor Dispute Resolution Lau: A C(atlavst for the Establishment oj'a Harmonious Labor
Relationship?, 30 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 409, 41(-18 (2009) (documenting critical
developments that led to the passage of the Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor
Disputes ("LMALD"), which is considered a "focal point" for labor dispute resolution).
126. See, e.g.,
BROWN, supra note 46, at 4 (referring to China's traditionally low wages
and labor standards as a source of pressure, and that since the 1990s Chinese leaders have
responded by passing legislation that seeks to address these concerns), Cooney, supra note 47,
at 1055. 1077 (declaring that "China's extraordinary economic success is marred by
widespread labor abuses" and that '[m]any kinds of abuse occur in apparent defiance of
Chinese labor law" and asserting the existence of "a high degree of dynamism inthe process of
legal reform").
127. Laodong Fa
[|Labor Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l
People's Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1,1995) (China) [hereinafter 1994 Labor Law];
see HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 11 (2d ed. 2003) (calling the 1994 Labor Law
'the most important labor-related aspect" of China's economic reforms because it codified the
employment contract system), see also BROWN, supra note 46, at 16 (referring to the 1994
Labor Law as China's "primary labor law").
128. See JOSEPHS, supra note 127, at41-43 (summarizing the history of the 1994 Labor
Law's codification within the context of sweeping market reforms); Cooney, supra note 47, at
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occupations and business organizations, including white-collar
professionals, migrant workers, foreign-owned companies, and
SOEs. 129 Most importantly, the law requires a written contract for all
employment relationships. 130 Among other things, contracts must
describe the duration of employment, worksite safety and health
conditions, compensation, and liability for breach.31
Although the State Council, the PRC's centralized administrative
authority, issues laws at a national level, the 1994 Labor Law obliges
businesses to follow regulations as promulgated by local labor
bureaus. 132 These local offices operate under the auspices of the
central Ministrv of Human Resources and Social Security
("MOHRSS"), which is responsible for overseeing Chinese
employment practices abroad. 3 3 Local labor bureaus, therefore, serve
as the departure and return point for China's international labor
population. 134 It is through these divisional offices that individuals
must address any issues arising from their employment agreements,
whether they are formed directly with companies or through labor
13
dispatch agencies. 5
1055 (calling the 1994 Labor Law "a major legislative achievement" that establishes the
contract employment system).
129. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 127, arts. 1-2; see JOSEPHS, supra note 127, at 43 44
(describing the comprehensive scope of the 1994 Labor Law).
130. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 127, arts. 16-17; see JOSEPHS, supra note 127, at 45
(stating that the 1994 Labor Law tracks the provisions of a previous law by setting forth the
requirement of written contracts for all types of employment).
131. 1994 Labor Law, supra note 127, art. 17.
132. Id. art. 106; see BROWN, supra note 46, at 13 (explaining that local labor bureaus
operate under the auspices of the central Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security but
must also report to local governments from whom they receive funding).
133. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 14 17 (explaining how employment laws are
administered at the local and national level), JOSEPHS, supra note 127, at 52-65 (explaining
that China's legal system allows for local enactment of laws provided they do not conflict with
national laws and examining how Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen administer labor laws
locally).
134. Laodong Hetong Fa (5
ME'IJ
) [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. I, 2008), art. 74 (China)
[hereinafter Labor Contract Law]; see MICHEL & BEURET, supra note 5, at 71 74 (providing a
narrative account of a worker's typical experience with a recruitment agency). See generally
Capaciv Buildingfor Migration Management in China Update, CBMM CHINA NEWSLETTER
(Int'l Org. for Migration Liaison Office in China, Beijing, China), Jan.-June, 2010, at 3
(describing efforts in Fujian, Liaoning, and Shandong provinces to educate the local
population on seeking overseas work).
135. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 13-19, 39 (describing the structure of the national
and local system and explaining how the Labor Contract Law specifies standards for staffing
firms); see also JOSEPHS, supra note 127, at 30 33 (describing the obligations of local dispatch
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Described by critics as the most important labor law
development since 1994, the 2008 Labor Contract Law elaborates
upon the older law and creates broader protections that can potentially
be extended to Chinese employers and employees overseas. 136 The
LCL more explicitly defines the scope and provisions employers must
provide in employment agreements, such as job descriptions, location,
working hours, rest days, remuneration, potential health and safety
hazards, and the measures the employer will take to guard against
them. 137 If employers fail to include these provisions or fail to pay
wages and overtime in accordance with the contracts, employees may
be eligible for monetary awards. 13' The law not only authorizes
employees to report poor working conditions, but also creates
criminal liability for employers who maintain poor conditions, coerce
work that endangers safety, or maintain an environment that leads to
39
physical or mental health harm.'
Further, the LCL expressly creates a set of legal obligations for
labor dispatch agencies, which, given their recent emergence, were
not adequately regulated by the 1994 law. 140 For purposes of
establishing the employer-employee relationship, the LCL appoints
these agencies as the employing unit, rather than the company for
whom their clients ultimately work. 14' This requires dispatch agencies
to form and sign the mandatory employment contract, and assigns
them default liability for the labor standards, conditions,
remuneration, and overtime policies of the enterprises that ultimately
utilize the employees.142 For the large number of workers who use
agencies to obtain jobs with Chinese enterprises in Africa, this means
agencies ("labor service companies") under national Ministry Notice policies that are enacted
at the local level).
136. See Josephs, supra note 72, at 379 (calling the 2008 law "arguably the most
important development since 1994"); see also Coone), supra note 47, at 1077 (concluding that
the new Labor Contract Law significantly expands employee rights and makes great progress
in filling major gaps left b' the 1994 law).
137. Labor Contract Law, supra note 134, arts. 8. 17.
138. See id.
arts.
82, 85.
139. Id arts. 32, 88.
140. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 28-29 (explaining that the 2008 Labor Contract Law
creates operating standards that address some of worst practices by agencies and companies
that previously were not illegal, such as using dispatched workers to displace regular
employees, and failing to place employees in full-time employment positions): Josephs, supra
note 72, at 380 (noting that because dispatch agencies were not a factor when the 1994 Labor
Law was passed, the new law fills a significant gap in legal coverage).
141.

Labor Contract Law, supra note 134, art.
58.

142. Id.arts.
58, 62.
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that any grievances that arise over a broad range of wage, safety and
rest policies ultimately must be remedied with the local dispatch
agency back home.14 3
Although the 2008 LCL represents a significant achievement,
critics complain that poor enforcement remains a crucial shortcoming
in China's efforts to grant greater protections to workers. 4 Foremost,
commentators find that leaving implementation and enforcement
responsibilities to local labor bureaus leads to fragmentation and
inconsistency. 145 Moreover, understaffing, corruption, local political
pressures, and an unwillingness to devote resources to pursue cases
46
hamper the enforcement powers of most local labor departments.
Although the new law was designed with particular consideration to
migrant workers, this group tends to suffer most from enforcement
deficiencies.147 The surplus of unskilled labor leaves this massive
population with minimal market leverage to compel employers to
accord with the law. 14 Thus, migrant laborers continue to face the

143. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (explaining that most Chinese
workers in Africa form their employment contracts with labor dispatch agencies which in turn
accept all liabilities arising from the employer-employee relationship).
144. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1078, 1096 (exploring, generally. why enforcement
remains a problem, despite steps to pass progressive legislations); Peerenboom, supra note 18,
at 322-24 (stating that the enforcement of economic and social rights remains a critical
problem in China): Yin Lily Zheng, Note, It's -Not Pi'hatIs on Paper,but What Is in Practice:
China's Neu; Labor Contract Lau and the Enforcemnent Problem, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L.
REv. 595, 596 (2009) (summarizing, generally the problem of labor law enforcement and
undertaking to address its causes).
145. See, e.g., Cooney, supr, note 47, at 106(Y-61 (describing the institutions charged
with implementing labor law, and noting that until recently j|t]he precise responsibilities,
procedural rules, and enforcement powers of labor inspectors were... governed mainly by a
complex set of rules promulgated .. at the provincial and municipal level"); Na Lan, Note, Is
There ANew Hope in Labor Rights Protectionfor Chine Migrant JWorkers?, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL'Y J. 482. 493 (2009) (stating that local government agencies bear partial responsibility
for poor labor law enforcement because they often tolerate abusive practices by local
businesses).
146 . See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1063-66 (listing economic, political, and
administrative factors that impede enforcement); Lan, supra note 145, at 493 (cataloguing the
barriers that stand in the way of better enforcement of migrant workers' rights).
147. See Cooney. supra note 47, at 1063 (explaining that firms that hire migrant workers
have tew incentives to abide by labor regulations); Jing, supra note 46, at 1083 (stating that it
is "well documented" that migrant workers face numerous labor abuses); Zheng, supra note
144, at 598 (noting that [m]igrant workers from rural areas 'bear the brunt of labor abuses"').
148. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1063 (explaining that because migrant workers
cannot leverage economic pressure to improve labor standards, firms that hire these groups are
more likely to violate labor standards); Lan, suprc note 145, at 493 (naming lack of "money

and time" as a reason migrants rarely pursue enforcement); Zheng, supra note 144, at 605 07
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same abuses of uncompensated overtime, wage arrears, and
occupational safety hazards that have long been documented
149
domestically in China, and that are emerging throughout Africa.
2. Law on Mediation and Arbitration of Labor Disputes
To a limited extent, the 2008 Law on Mediation and Arbitration
of Labor Disputes helps improve overseas workers' access to labor
dispute mechanisms if their Chinese employers violate the Labor and
Labor Contract Laws. 150 It allows a broad range of subjects to
circumvent litigation and first go to mediation or arbitration.15 ' These
include disputes arising from the confirmation of an employment
contract, working hours, and rest. 52 Further, it builds upon the 1994
Labor Law's provision allowing enterprises to establish internal
mediation committees to assist in dispute resolution by providing
greater opportunities for worker-employer consultation. 153 For
enterprises located far from accessible labor mediation organizations,

(explaining that "filing fees," cost of legal counsel, and "protracted proceedings" make labor
dispute mechanisms prohibitively expensive for migrants).
149. See Lan, supra note 145, at 489-91 (listing low wages, nonpayment of wages,
illegal overtime, and safety hazards as abuses migrants typically face); supra notes 74-83 and
accompanying text (summarizing the most frequently reported labor, safety, housing, and
security issues arising among Chinese workers employed by Chinese firms in Africa). See
generally Jing, supra note 46 (exploring, generally, the types of labor abuses migrant workers
suffer).
150. See Zhao, supra note 125, at 410 (explaining that the LMALD was drafted as a
response to increasingly complicated employment relationships that arose out of China's
economic development); see also BROWN, supra note 46, at 168 (noting that the LMALD
provides employees with increased accessibility and "greater finality to" arbitration).
151 Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (
LN
) [Law on Mediation
and Arbitration of Labor Disputes] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1. 2008) (China) [hereinafter LMALD]. See Zhao, supra
note 125, at 418 (stating that the new law greatly expands the scope of arbitrable subject
matter).
152. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 170 (listing labor dispute topics, in order of
frequency as "wages, termination, insurance, and work injury"); Zhao, supra note 125, at 418
(summarizing the "three new types of disputes" now covered by the new law as disputes
arising from "the confirmation of a labor relationship," working hours and time off, and
medical compensation for occupation industries, and cataloguing the disputes that fall within
these categories).
153. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 171 (explaining that the LMALD broadens the scope
of allowable mediation forums). Zhao, supra note 125, at 418 (describing increased
opportunities for internal dispute mechanisms as one ofthe LMALD's new developments).
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such as overseas enterprises, this development opens up new channels
154
for workers to seek remedy.
Since the LMALD took effect in May 2008, use of employment
arbitration has risen precipitously. 55 Given that the law has only been
in place for four years and Chinese workers in Africa sign
employment agreements for one to three years, it is yet unclear to
what extent these workers are utilizing arbitration committees upon
their return. 156 Experts have found, however, that despite the
improved access to arbitration, domestic migrants remain unable to
utilize these channels because they lack money and adequate
knowledge of the legal system. 1 57 Further, researchers suggest that the
correspondingly high rate of court applications indicates that the new
labor arbitration system frequently fails to resolve disputes. 158 Even
when arbitral awards are made, it is difficult to get committees or
court orders to enforce them.59
154. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 89 (surmising that the LMALD "supports the ability
of migrant workers to more easily gain access to labor arbitration"); Zhao, supra note 125, at
419 (concluding that the LM&ALD's broad definition of mediation organization creates new
channels for dispute resolution, especially insmall villages and towns).
155. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 168 (citing that Guangdong Province experienced
more than a 100% increase in labor arbitration cases from May 2007 to May 2008); Statistical
Communiqud on Labor and Social Security Development in 2008,NATI BUREAU OF STAT.OF
CHINA (May 22, 2009, 10:05 AM), http:i/
wv.stats.gov.cn/englishinewsandcoming
events/t20090522 402560900.htm (citing that in 2008 labor arbitration committees handled
964,000 cases, a ninety-eight percent increase over the previous year).
156. See Gong, supra note 76, at 3 (referring, generally, to several cases in which return
workers have sued Chinese companies and employment agencies, but failing, however, to
provide further information about these suits);
see also Politzer, supra note 7 (stating that most
migrants return to China after the completion of their one to three year contracts, '[h]owever,
there is very little scholarly or empirical research on recent Chinese migration to Africa").
157. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1070 (explaining that achieving arbitral success often
requires multistep procedures and sophisticated legal maneuverings that entail expenses that
migrants cannot afford); Jing, supra note 46, at 1104 (noting that the long appeals period
imposes a critical strain that most migrant workers cannot sustain); Lan, supra note 145, at 493
(citing education, discrimination, and significant expenses as some of the barriers that prevent
migrants from accessing legal protection).
158. See BROWN, supra note 46, at 180 (observing a sharp increase, in recent years, in
the number of arbitration cases that claimants have appealed to the courts and suggesting that
the LMA&LD's attempts to provide greater finality to arbitration were intended to decrease this
number); Cooney, supra note 47, at 1068 (citing the research of Chinese labor scholar Zheng
Shang-yuan).
159. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1070 (explaining that enforcement can involve
lengthy proceedings and that legal aid is largely unavailable, resulting in heavy financial
burdens on workers), see also Peerenboom, supra note 18, at 320, 322-24 (citing the weak
capacity of dispute resolution mechanisms and the closure of many businesses during the

global recession as two reasons why the courts have been unable to eniorce awards).
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Finally, these domestic mechanisms supply ex post remedies
upon completion of the work contract and return home. 160 If a

violation of employment terms requires immediate redress, workers
have no choice but to resort to local remedies available in Africa.16 '
Although the LCL sets standards for a broad range of workplace
conditions, local African laws may supersede these provisions where
they grant more robust protections-especially where a country has a
direct interest in the activities of foreign companies operating on its
Soil.

1 62

3. Recommendations for Improved Enforcement
Commentators cite better enforcement of current law as one of
the most essential requirements to achieving adequate protection of
migrant worker rights. 63 Among his recommendations, Professor
Sean Cooney advocates for systematic efforts to decentralize control
at the national level and empower local labor departments to apply
more robust economic and criminal sanctions on labor law

160. See Cooney,supra note 47, at 1060 61 (describing China's "command and control"
labor regulatory system that relies heavily on the imposition of sanctions to enforce the law
after it has been violated): Jing, supra note 46, at 1130 (expressing doubt that imposing
penalties on officials and employers who violate the law will improve ongoing implementation
and enforcement of the law).
161. See L \NGRLE, supra note 117, at 5-6 (explaining that domestic law and its
accompanying remedies may be available where local law grants greater protections than the
law governing the contract); Greene, supra note 15, at 54 (noting that liabilities arising in tort
will affect jurisdiction and choice of law considerations); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 2, at 7 8 (making regulatory recommendations to both the Chinese and Zambian
governnents to improve working conditions in Chinese enterprises in Zambia, indicating that
both legal systems bear responsibility for improving legal protections).
162. See Raisner, supra note 122, at 52 (stating that, when they provide greater
protections, domestic labor laws will preempt conflicting, less-protective laws of a contract's
nation of origin where): see also LANGILLE, supra note 117, at 54 (explaining that domestic
laws may govern international employment relationships that arise intort or human rights).
163. See, e.g.,
Cooney, upra note 47, at 1071, 1078, 1081-94 (noting that migrant
workers infrequently use dispute mechanism because they lack access, alleging that the new
Labor Contract Law does not address China's systematic enforcement failures, and laying out
several proposals to improve enforcement); Jing, supra note 46, at 1130-31 (naming lack of
governnent oversight as a primary cause of labor violations against migrant workers, and
stating that poor enforcement will undermine any legislative attempts to improve labor rights);
Peerenboom, supra note 18, at 325-37 (identifying the Chinese cowrts as an institution that can
improve economic and social rights through enforcement of existing law and laying out
recommendations).
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violators. 64 Cooney and several others also call upon corporations,
NGOs, and other nonstate actors to promote worker rights through
public awareness campaigns and improvement of legal aid services.16 5
On the other hand, Professor Randall Peerenboom emphasizes
judicial reform as the key method of improving enforcement of
worker (as well as other economic and social) rights. 6 Peerenboom
calls for the judiciary to be more assertive in providing remedies to
workers, especially in cases involving unsafe working conditions and
the failure to pay wages. 16 7 Finding more violations and providing
more remedies, he argues, will encourage the PRC to more adequately
address general policy issues affecting vulnerable populations. 161
Finally, Peerenboom proposes relaxing judicial standing requirements
so that third parties, such as NGOs and other public interest groups,
can bring suits on behalf of individuals who lack the resources to file
their own complaints. 169
C. Protectionsin South Africa's Employment Laws
South Africa's extensive, constitutionally-based system of labor
and labor dispute laws reflect the key role labor rights played in the
struggle against apartheid and their continued importance in South
African society. 17 In fact, the 1996 Constitution "may be the only

164. See id.at 1084 88 (proposing and assessing several alternatives to China's
traditional "command and control" labor regulation system). Professor Cooney is a
comparative and Chinese labor law professor at Melbourne Law School.
165. See Cooney, supra note 47, at 1086-95 (citing the earlier work of Randall
Peerenboom and suggesting that increased participation by employers, public interest workers,
and the media can improve labor rights implementation): Lan, supra note 145, at 516 (calling
for the bolstering of legal aid to assist migrant laborers who seek enforcement of rights);
Zheng, supra note 144, at 612-17 (proposing that workers seek enforcement through class
action lawsuits).
166. See Peerenboom, supra note 18, at325 28 (explaining ways in which the judicial
system might take a "somewhlat more proactive, multipronged approach"). Randall
Peerenboom is an expert on Chinese law and a professor of law at La Trobe University.
167. See id.at 325 27 (identifying, inter alia, wage and termination claims as relatively
simple cases that can be resolved efficiently using the structures already in place).
168. See id.at 326-28 (noting that this method will allow the cowrts to develop a more
rigorous ".Iurisprudence of equality and non-discrimination").
169. See id. at 327-28 (citing successful experiments that relaxed the standing
requirements for bringing environmental actions and advocating for an expansion to actions
involving economic and social rights).
170. See SONIA BENDIX, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS rN, SOUTH AFRICA 81-83 (4th ed.

2001) (recounting the steps legislators took to ensure that labor rights were adequately
represented in the new democratic system being created in the early 1990s); Stelzner, supra
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[constitution] that establishes fair labor practices as a constitutional
right.''17' And although Chinese law will govern the contracts formed
between Chinese employees and their employers, a basic tenet of
South African employment law holds that contracts may be
superseded by statute where the two conflict.' 2 Notably, South Africa
extends statutory and constitutional labor protections, including
access to the justice system, to both documented and undocumented
73
migrant workers.1
Two statutes, the 1995 Labour Relations Act ("LRA") and the
1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act ("BCEA"), form the
foundations of South Africa's labor law system. 114 Pursuant to
Section 23 of the Constitution, they define labor rights and establish a
specialized system of courts and commissions to resolve disputes
outside of mainstream litigation. 175 Where these laws do not expressly
provide a cause of action, complainants may find protections under
common law and international law. 176
note 102, at 233 (stating that South Africa's labor laws were revised extensively during the
1990s postdemocracy era as a result of labor groups' instrumental political activism).
171. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 23(l) ("Everyone has the right to fair labour practices.")see Andre van Niekerk, Business South Africa, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS, supra note 115, at 65, 65.
172. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at 96, 98 (explaining that contracts may not provide
for employment terms less favorable than the minimum standards prescribed by statute); Darcy
Du Toit, Oil on Troubled Waters? The Slippery Interjace Beiween the Contractof Enployinert
and Statutov Labour Law, 125. S. AFR. L.J. 95, 95 (2008) (explaining that although the
contract forms the fundamental framework of the employment relationship, its terms will be
superseded by statutes that conflict with it).
173. See Cottie, supra note 106, at 4, 6 (explaining that although employing illegal
migrant workers was prohibited by the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, a 2008 Labor Court ruling
extended Labour Relations Act ("LRA") protection and court access to undocumented
workers); hInnigrant WVorker, supra note 106, at 10 (summarizing the ruling and reporting on
government and labor reactions to it).
174. Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (S. Afr.); Basic Conditions of Employment
Act No. 75 of 1997 (S. Afr.); see BENDIX, supra note 170, at 98 (stating that the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act ("BCEA") is the most important statute regarding individual
employment relationships and that the LRA provides additional individual rights): Craig
Bosch, Bent Out ofShape?: Critically Assessing the Application ofthe Right to kair Labour
Practices in Developing South African Labour Law, 19 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 374, 375
(2008) (citing a Labour Court opinion that declares that aggrieved employees are obliged, in
the first instance, to seek remedies tor unfair labor practices under the LRA).
175. See Du Toit, supra note 172, at 97 11.10 (calling the LRA a statute that "expressly
giv[es] effect to [Section] 23 of the Constitution"); van Niekerk, supra note 171, at 65
(explaining that in addition to civil courts, domestic labor legislation provides the
Constitutional Cour and Labour Court as labor disputes forums).
176. Labour Relations Act ch. I § 1(b) (declaring that one of the stated objectives of the
act is to "give effect to the obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the
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Foremost, the LRA and BCEA give effect to the constitutional
guarantee to fair labor practices, in part, by explicitly defining
employee rights and employer obligations. 177 Whereas China's LCL
governs mostly administrative and procedural aspects of employeremployee relationships, the LRA and BCEA list substantive
guidelines that all employers must follow.178 Of particular importance
to Chinese enterprises in South Africa is the BCEA, which sets out
the minimum terms and conditions of employment. 179 For example,
Chapter 2 of the BCEA describes, in painstaking detail, precise rules
governing overtime hours and wages, meal intervals, and rest
periods.8 China's LCL, on the other hand, requires employers only
to include some provision for wages, overtime and rest policies, but
stipulates no de minimis requirements."'
Although the BCEA grants the Minister of Labour general
authority to monitor and report on individual labor sectors, exposure
of violations largely depends upon individuals or collective groups
International Labour Organisation"); Basic Conditions of Employment Act ch. 1, § 2(b)
(declaring one of the law's objectives as to "give effect to the obligations incurred by the
Republic as a member state ofthe International Labour Organisation"); see Bosch, supra note
174, at 374, 379 (citing a Labour Court opinion that conceded that the Constitution allows both
statutory and common law regulation of labor practices).
177. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at 88 89, 93 94 (outlining how the South African
Constitution provides for labor rights and explaining how the LRA and BCEA are the key
pieces of legislation ensuring these rights): see also Bosch, supra note 174, at 379-81
(establishing that the purpose of the LRA isto give effect to Section 23 of the Constitution and
exploring instances in which the law could be deemed unconstitutional).
178. Labour Relations Act ch. 1. sched. 2; Basic Conditions of Employment Act cis. 25; see BENDIX, supra note 170, at 113 (noting that the BCEA applies to all employees except
for members of South Africa's national defense and intelligence departments) see also, e.g.,
Labour Contract Law, supra note 134, arts. 4-6, 10-11, 15-17 (establishing several procedural
requirements for the formation and execution of labor contracts).
179. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at83, 113 (describing the BCEA's primary purpose as
ensuring that all workers receive minimum work conditions and noting that the law places
significant responsibilities on employers); Stelzner, supra note 102, at221 (describing the
basic structure and goals of the BCEA).
180. Basic Conditions of Employment Act ch. 2, § 10 (forbidding employers from, inter
alia, permitting or requiring employees to work more than ten overtime hours a week, and
requiring overtime payment of at least time and half); Id. ch. 2, § 14 (requiring employers to
grant, inter alia, a one hour meal break to any employee working more than five consecutive
hours and prohibiting employers from contracting around meal breaks of less than thirty
minutes); Id ch. 2. § 15 (requiring employers to grant employees, inter alia, a daily rest of
twelve consecutive hours between ending and recommencing work).
181. See supra notes 131, 137 39 and accompanying text (describing provisions of the
1994 Labor Law and 2008 Labor Contract Law that list mandatory subject matter that must be
included in Chinese employment contracts, but wvhicl
do not set threshold standards for these
subjects).
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utilizing South Africa's dual conciliation and court systems. 182
Similar to China's LMALD, the independent Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration ("CCMA") has broad
authority to hear and settle disputes. 183 Whereas the LMALD
encourages individuals to use mediation or arbitration before resorting
to the courts, the CCMA is the mandatory first stop for parties before
they seek adjudication. 184 Importantly for groups unfamiliar with
South Africa's legal system, the Commission has authority to connect
parties to legal advice or representation. 185 If these nonjudicial
mechanisms fail to achieve resolution, parties may resort to the twotiered labor court system, which consists of the Labour Court and
Labour Appeal Court. 18
When the statutes fall short of providing legal coverage to
Chinese workers, the common law can extend fair labor
protections. 187 Critically, South Africa's vast jurisprudence on the
LRA reflects a common law system willing to impute fair labor
practices where they have not been expressly written into a
contract. 88 And when the claimants cannot show that the terms of
182. Basic Conditions of Employment Act ch. 9, § 59; see Vongoverimental
Organizations and Academics: Evance Kalu/a, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL LABOR
STANDARDS, supra note 115, at 72, 73 (explaining that the Minister's Employment Conditions
Commission monitors practices on a sector-wide basis for the purposes of establishing labor
policy).
183. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at 124 25 (describing the scope of the Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration's ("CCMA") jurisdiction and its additional
authority to make recommendations and refer cases elsewhere); van Niekerk, supra note 171,
at 66 (stating that the CCMA hears all labor disputes).
184. Labour Relations Act ch. 7, § 115; see BENDIX, supra note 170, at 124 (explaining
that the CCMA is empowered to conduct arbitration or refer the matter to the Labor Court
should conciliation first tail); van Niekerk, supra note 171, at 66 (describing the policy of
mandatory CCMA conciliation prior to adjudication as a major change introduced by the
LRA).
185. Labour Relations Act ch. 7, § 115(2); see BENDIX, supra note 170, at 125 (listing
the authority to assist parties in obtaining legal advice or representation as an additional power
of the CCMA).
186. Labour Relations Act ch. 7, §§ 157, 167; see BENDIX, supra note 170, at 124
(explaining that the Labor Court may hear cases if conciliation fails).
187. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at 88 (explaining that contract law governs
employment relationships, which are supplemented by common law principles that can in turn
be superseded by statute); see also Bosch, supra note 174, at 382 (asserting that when
legislation fails to protect fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, courts must
develop the common law).
188. See Du Toit, supra note 172, at 96-97 1.10 (summarizing how, in a recent decision,
the Supreme Couwt of Appeal ignored LR'x jurisprudence and interred certain labor rights
from common law where they did not exist in ain employment contract); see also Bosch, supra
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their employment contract have been per se violated, they may choose
I
to instead bring their claim under the LRA.89
Some South African
commentators have criticized these developments for obscuring the
relationship between statute and common law.' 90 This more equitable
approach, however, potentially removes a high hurdle for Chinese
workers who already face an uphill battle if they choose to seek
remedies in a foreign legal system. 91 Rather than attempting to
elucidate the various provisions of their Mandarin contracts, workers
can show that employer practices conflict with South African law or
general conceptions of fair practice. 192 This also narrows the
opportunities for sophisticated Chinese corporations to evade
adjudication by asserting that they have not violated a specific statute
on the books. 93
Although South Africa's conciliation system has achieved
modest success in resolving disputes, critical barriers prevent Chinese
1 94
workers from using these channels to resolve their labor issues.
note 174, at 379 88 (analyzing numerous court decisions that interpret the LRA in light of the
constitution and labor contracts).
189. See Fedlife sAssurance Ltd. v.Jfotfaardt 2002 (1)SA 49 (SCA) at 13 para. 17 (S.
Aft.) (holding that the LRA does not explicitly preclude an employee's right to seek remedy
under common law); Du Toit, supra note 172, at 10506 (explaining the Supreme Cowt of
Appeal holding creates two possible theories under which employees may bring action,
common law breach of contract or violation of the LRA).
190. See Bosch, supra note 174, at 375, 387 (arguing that some labor rulings have
created confusion and attempting to clarify the practical legal effect of the JWoifriardt
decision); Du Toit, supra note 172, at 96, 106 (concluding that the recent decision effectively
creates a complicated dual model of statutory and common law dispute resolution, which "has
not gone without criticism").
191 See, e.g.,
Du Toit, supra note 172, at 106-07 (calling the Constitution the starting
point in identifying employment rights and explaining that the common law remains a source
of equitable principals); Bosch, supra note 174, at 389 (concluding that recent labor rulings
"strengthen[] the hand of employees" and create common law remedies that lack the
limitations of LRA remedies).
192. See BENDIX, supra note 170, at 103-04 (explaining that employment relationships
are governed by common law contract principles as well as statutes and that employees make
seek remedies under common law). See generally Du Toit, supra note 172 (exploring the
interplay between statutory labor law and common law and equitable principles).
193. See, e.g, Bosch, supra note 174, at 389 (suggesting that recent court decisions
undermine the balance between employer and employee rights, shifting the advantage to
employees); Du Toit, supra note 172, at 108 15 (exploring applications of common law that
would result in favorable employee decisions, where, under the LRA, they potentially would
not).
194. See van Nierkerk, supra note 171, at 66 (calling the Labour Court and CCMA an
effective means of [labor standards] implementation" and noting good settlement rates
despite administrative challenges throughout the country); Fenwick et al.,
supra note 14, at
182 83 (explaining that South Africa's labor dispute resolution system has served as a model
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First, enforcement of labor law is weak. 1 5 As Professor Jonathan
Klaaren notes, anyone exposed to the South African media would
probably not be surprised to learn that labor laws are not followed
when it comes to migrant workers.1 " Chronically understaffed and
underfunded, the Labour Department cannot effectively monitor labor
practices, especially when it comes to foreign workers."'
Secondly, gaining access to dispute resolution mechanisms
remains difficult, even for local workers. 198 Lack of institutional
memory, insufficient resources, and fear of alienating large
transnational corporations are cited as several reasons why the state
does not make more progress in widening access to the CCMA.1 99
Chinese nationals are at even greater risk of falling through the cracks
created by poor enforcement. Typically congregating in tight-knit
enclaves, and rarely speaking the local language, they are largely cut
off from their host country's social systems. 20 0 They often have

for surrounding nations and that the flexible system can easily adapt to meet community
needs).
195. See Jonathan Klaaren, .4 Comment on the Human Rights RWatch Report
'Unprotected Migrants: Zimbabweans in South Africa "sLimpopo Province,' 7 AFR. IUM.
RTS. L.J. 249, 251 (2007) (stating that South African labor laws are weakly enforced):
Immigrant RWorkers, supra note 106, at 10 (noting that while migrant workers are vulnerable to
exploitation, South Africans are not safe from abuse either).
196. See Klaaren, supra note 195, at 251 (critiquing the findings of an HRW report on
migrant workers and South African labor law enforcement). Jonathan Klaaren isa professor of
law and head of the University Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
197. See Immigrant Workers, supra note 106, at 10 (describing the inability of the
Labour Department to effectively monitor labor practices throughout South Africa and noting
that, as a result, foreign migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation); see also Fenwick
et al., supra note 14, at 193-94 (stating that labor migrants are likely to work under
substandard conditions and that, in general, lack of capacity hampers labor law enforcement in
southern Africa).
198. See Charles Nupen, ILO Technical Advisor, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS, smura note 115, at 10, 10-11 (citing the need for improved access to
institutional mechanisms for dispute prevention and resolution); Jeffrey Wheeler, ILO
Strengthening Labour Administration in Southern Africa, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL
LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 115, at 13, 13 14 (calling tor the capacity-strengthening of
dispute resolution systems in the South African region).
199. See Fenwick et al.,
supra note 14, at 186-205 (exploring major challenges to
regional labor law enforcement including poverty, underfunding, conflict with economic
development goals, and migration); Tekl, supra note 114, at 4 (stating that the growing power
of transnational corporations has "defied the regulatory power of the nation state").
200. See PARK, supra note 9, at 10 11,15 (describing the isolation of Chinese work
enclaves generally, and explaining that the latest wave of immigrants to enter South Africa
lack language skills and isolate themselves within the more remote regions where they tend to
settle); Lee, supra note 6,at 652 53 (describing Chinese enclaves as secluded and guarded by
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limited knowledge of local law or their rights under it. 2° 1 Moreover,
as they become more visible in South Africa, they are increasingly
exposed to resentment, often fingered as a cause of South Africa's
troubled economy and high unemployment . 2 2 So while the nation's
labor and justice systems, in theory, offer considerable protections to
Chinese nationals, these channels remain largely closed to them in
fact.
Despite the lack of information on the experience of Chinese
workers in Africa, news reports and scholarly articles indicate that
they are often vulnerable to the same labor abuses documented in the
local African populations employed by Chinese enterprises. Although
Chinese and South African law reflect significant efforts to regulate
employment relationships and labor standards, weak enforcement
mechanisms result in a failure to adequately protect Chinese migrant
workers. Academics call for judicial reforms and increased public
advocacy to improve labor law enforcement and access to dispute
resolution mechanisms.
III. DOMNIESTIC AND INTEN\4 TIONAL LA W PROVIDE
JVNADEQ UA TE PROTECTIOS TO CHINESE WORKERS IN
AFRICA
Although the Chinese and South African legal systems contain
sufficient provisions to protect the rights of overseas Chinese
workers, in practice, their monitoring and enforcement mechanisms
fail to meet this objective.2 13 If the China-South Africa relationship is
security personnel and observing that nearly none of the workers speak the local languages,
with a few speaking some English).
201. See PARK, supra note 9, at 15 (explaining that recent Chinese immigrants to South
Africa lack education, business ties, or knowledge of their new home) Lee, supra note 6, at
651-53 (describing, generally, efforts by Chinese employers to ensure employees do not
become too familiar with their temporary homes); see also, e.g., Ng, supra note 78 (reporting
on the experience of a Chinese migrant to South Africa who noted that while locals "insist on
their labor rights" she dared not voice similar grievances against her Chinese employer).
202. See PARK, supra note 9, at 13 15 (illustrating several examples of anti-Chinese
sentiment in South Africa, which tends to be politically and economically motivated); Guliwe
& Mkhonta, supra note 57, at 309 (positing that the influx of Chinese enterprises and cheap
Chinese products into South Africa leads to unemployment); Orr, supra note 87, at 8 9
(calling people-to-people relations the "weakest link" in China-South Africa relations, and
identifying language and China's economic rise in South Africa as causes of local suspicions);
York, supra note 96, at A 19 (surmising that Chinese enterprises' practices of paying below the
minimum wage fosters anger in local South African communities and exacerbates poverty).
203. See suprav notes 144-49, 157-59. 194-201 and accompanying text (describing the
generally weak enforcement of Chinese and South African labor law).
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to serve as a model to the rest of Africa, improvement is needed in
key areas. Section A analyzes the primary shortcomings in Chinese
and South African Law. Section B recommends measures the PRC
should take to ensure employers comply with Chinese law. Because
the status Chinese workers maintain in relation to their employers in
Africa parallels that of China's internal migrants, Section B's
recommendations will draw from scholarly works on this group.
Section C identifies the actions South African actors should undertake
to ensure Chinese workers' rights are not violated.
A. Inadequacies Under Chinese and South African Law
Although China s new employment laws represent a major step
forward in expanding workers' rights at home, they do not adequately
address the particular problems created when Chinese enterprises take
their workers overseas . 2 04 And while international and domestic
worker migration is a serious issue confronting the PRC, its new labor
laws fail to specifically tailor provisions to meet these populations'
special needs. Instead the LCL, by default, allocates much of the
burden of managing and protecting migrants to labor dispatch
agencies. 2 05 As independent enterprises, their profits depend upon
their ability to efficiently funnel large numbers of employees through
their doors and into jobs. They are not in the best position to monitor
the rights of these individuals, especially when Chinese firms take
these workers thousands of miles overseas.
Furthermore, the PRC's system of administration cannot
adequately ensure that local and provincial governments properly
execute and enforce national law. 2 6 Although local administration
allows provincial and municipal governments to individualize laws to
the particular needs of their population, it can lead to disparate
impacts both upon workers who remain employed locally and the
workers who form contracts at home, then go overseas. 0 7 Local labor
bureaus may have strong ties to the businesses located within their
204. See supra notes 144-49, 157 61, 194 201 and accompanying text (describing
general deficiencies in the legal protections extended to migrant workers and additional
barriers to legal remedies).
205. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text (citing the provisions of the 2008
Labor Contract Law which allocates employment liability to labor dispatch agencies).
206. See supra notes 145 48 and accompanying text (summarizing the primary reasons
why local implementation of central government law leads to inconsistent enforcement).
207. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (describing how varying local

conditions can lead to different enforcement outcomes).
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municipalities. 2 11 No matter how friendly the relationship, however,
they cannot, at the community level, deploy the necessary resources
and expertise to advise and regulate the overseas labor practices of
sophisticated Chinese multinational corporations. 2 0' Requiring labor
bureaus below the national level to play any role in the regulation of
overseas employment relationships will lead to inconsistent treatment
as well as enormous administrative costs.
Finally, China's LMALD opens greater channels to labor dispute
resolution, but leaves barriers to China's overseas population. 21 Both
the 1994 Labor Law and LMALD allow companies to establish their
own internal dispute resolution mechanisms as a first line of
conciliation. 1 These, however, are not mandatory requirements. 2
At the national level, the LMALD's jurisdictional scope can create
gaps large enough for overseas companies to slip through. Simply by
navigating the LMALD at the local level, large companies with a
widespread presence throughout China can evade jurisdiction for
complaints brought by returning workers from Africa. 2 '1 Although
these workers should qualify for an exception to the law's one-year
statute of limitations, this requirement places a heavy burden on them
to bring timely complaints, especially if their supervisors remain in
Africa.
Based upon the conditions described in Part I and the
requirements stipulated by Chinese law, Chinese regulations may fall
short of the standards South Africa requires of employers in its
country.214 Thus, South Africa is in a much better position to monitor
and enforce labor standards. In practice, however, its system fails to
208. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (explaining that municipal labor
bureaus are empowered to regulate according to the specific needs of their local business
environment): supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that corruption affects the
enforcement of local regulations).
209. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (summarizing the reasons why legal
enforcement tends to be weakest at the local bureau level).
210. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text (highlighting both the successes
and weaknesses of the LMALD).
211. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting that China's LMLALD allows
companies to establish internal mediation committees to address work disputes).
212. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining that it is not mandatory for
firms to create these committees).
213. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (summarizing the critical
shortcomings in local labor law administration that result in weak enforcement).
214. See supra notes 77-80, 137-39 and accompanying text (describing labor violations
committed by Chinese companies and the LCL's basic mandatory provisions which fail to
adequately address such abuses).
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adequately protect the Chinese expatriates working within its
borders.2 1
Although labor protections are deeply rooted in the nation's
democratic history and jurisprudence, access to these constitutionally
guaranteed rights is severely limited in the case of a population that
exists at society's margins. 16 Language and culture present seemingly
insurmountable barriers, as does fear of retaliation by employers.
Given the developing state of Chinese employment law, it is difficult
enough for workers to bring complaints against their employers at
home. When the employer has brought them to a foreign country and
controls their safe passage back, many workers are likely to find
futility in any attempts to address labor violations.
Furthermore, South Africa's general social and economic
landscape represents an additional obstacle to relief. As South African
leaders continue to engage the PRC in the interest of long-term
economic benefits, popular hostility towards the Chinese grows. They
are commonly seen as unwelcome interlopers in a country that
continues to struggle with widespread poverty and high
unemployment.2 17 Therefore, it can reasonably be expected that where
limited resources can be expended to address unfair labor practices,
South Africa's legal system will make its own citizens a priority over
visiting Chinese.
B. China Should Expand Coverage offIts New Labor Laws
China's new labor laws require reform in order to adequately
address the particular vulnerabilities of workers who are sent
overseas. Because Chinese workers in Africa share similar
employment arrangements with China's internal migrants-namely,
they form short-term contracts under the same Chinese law, are
subject to similar working conditions, and lack access to the same
dispute resolution
mechanisms-this
Section assesses the

215. See supra notes 194-99 and accompanying text (citing the critical weaknesses in
South Africa's labor law and dispute resolution system).
216. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text (describing the general experience
of Chinese migrant workers in South Africa).
217. See supra notes 102 03, 200 02 and accompanying text (discussing South Africa's
economic difficulties and other reasons for rising anti-Chinese sentiment in South Africa).
218. See suipra note 197 and accompanying text (describing general failures by South
Africa to protect migrantv orkers, despite judicial efforts to recognize them).
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recommendations advocated by scholars on China's domestic
migrants. 219
While some of these recommendations present promising
prospects for migrants within China, others will not adequately
address the needs of Chinese workers in Africa. Foremost,
decentralizing labor enforcement will not provide effective
protections to this specific group.220 Instead, additional legislation at
the national level should streamline the way laws are administered
over the Chinese multinationals that take citizens to Africa. The LCL
should be amended to require Ministry of Human Resources and
Social Security ("MOHRSS") national and provincial offices to
oversee all Chinese companies seeking to employ workers for
overseas projects. In addition to issuing unified policy on the
obligations firms owe to Chinese employees abroad, these offices
should develop monitoring strategies to ensure corporate compliance.
Among other things, the MOHRSS should require companies to
directly report on the number of Chinese citizens they employ abroad
and the measures they take to ensure employment contracts adhere to
the LCL.
At the municipal level, regulation of overseas employment
should be limited to targeted education and feedback programs. While
local labor bureaus are not in the best position to keep tabs on the
foreign affairs of China's industrial giants, they are, however, best
qualified to protect
the interests of the individual workers in their
communities. 221 Although Cooney asserts that nonstate actors should
promote awareness among migrants, such policies should not let local
labor bureaus off the hook.22 As a worker's primary point of contact
in China, these departments should be charged with designing
advocacy and education campaigns to address the specific profile and
concerns of the local workforce. If workers tend to be recruited by a
particular industry, or tend to be sent to a particular part of Africa,
219. See supra notes 163 69 and accompanying text (highlighting the recommendations
advanced by Cooney, Peerenboom, and others for improving enforcement of Chinese labor
law).
220. See supra notes 163 65 and accompanying text (summarizing Cooney's
suggestions for labor law enforcement).
221. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (describing the relationship local
labor bureaus maintain with local workers, even as they migrate to other localities for work).
222 . See supra note 165 and accompanying text (calling for corporations,
nongovernmental organizations, and other nonstate actors to use their expertise to improve
labor law enforcement).
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municipal bureaus can tailor programs to address the specific issues
surrounding the type of work and environment. Most importantly,
these bureaus can ensure that individuals are properly informed of
their rights under Chinese law and the particular obligations their
employers owe to them while overseas.
Additionally,
while
Peerenboom
offers
compelling
recommendations for judicial reform, namely providing more
remedies to workers and relaxing standing requirements, most of
them will fail to address the critical problem of access to dispute
resolution. 2 To improve access to labor dispute resolution
mechanisms after an employment relationship has been forged, the
LMALD should be amended in several key ways. First, the provisions
allowing companies to establish their own internal mediation
committees should be a mandatory requirement for every firm with an
overseas presence, in each foreign office they maintain. The LMALD
should also require firms to inform employees, before their relocation,
of the existence of these committees and the identity of available
arbitration mechanisms locally and in China, should internal
conciliation fail.
Further, local bureaus should be charged with ensuring, under
the LMALD, that returning Chinese workers have access to local
arbitration committees. As part of their education campaigns they
should instruct workers, both upon their departure and return, on how
to pursue claims. Because of their exceptional circumstances, the
LMALD should expressly extend the statute of limitations to overseas
workers, allowing them one year, from the day of their return, to file a
complaint. And, as Peerenboom suggests, standing requirements
should be relaxed so that the third parties that are more qualified to
utilize the Chinese court system can represent these groups.
Finally, because labor dispatch agencies severely convolute the
relationship between overseas firms and their employees, the LCL
should explicitly bar them from brokering these arrangements.
Although they perform an essential service to the mainland, their
recruiting practices have been subject to immense scrutiny in recent

223. See supra notes 167 69 and accompanying text (recommending that judges make
more rulings in favor of workers and that courts relax standing requirements).
224. See suipra note 169 and accompanying text (calling for the relaxing of standing
requirements to allow better access to legal representation).
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years. 22 1 While the PRC is taking steps to regulate the industry, more
progress is necessary. 26 Until a better system is in place to monitor
the way these agencies manage employment contracts and deploy
workers, the PRC should require enterprises to directly hire the
workers for their African projects. This will necessarily require
companies to sign employment contracts and assume all liabilities
under the LCL. Most importantly, it will give workers in Africa direct
and immediate access to the counterparties to their agreements. If
violations arise, workers will have better opportunities to remedy the
situation while in country, rather than wait for their return home to
seek redress.
C. South Afi ica Should Engage China at the National and Enterj~rise
Levels
South Africa boasts an impressive statutory and judicial system
of labor law protection and enforcement. Efforts to improve access to
Chinese workers should therefore focus on policy reform. Improved
employment conditions for Chinese nationals in South Africa mean
improved conditions for the South African citizens who work in
Chinese firms. South Africa should, therefore, leverage its position as
China's number one partner in Africa to obtain better concessions for
its own population. It should condition future investments upon
assurances that when the PRC helps Chinese enterprises establish
operations in South Africa, they are committed to complying with
local employment laws, and to treating African and Chinese workers
equally.
Further, South Africa's Minister of Labour should exercise the
authority granted to him under the BCEA to formulate a nationwide
policy on Chinese employers. 7 Because Chinese enterprises in South
Africa remain at a manageable number, a multisector study of their
labor practices is feasible. 22 ' The Minister should use the results of
225. See supra notes 51 54, 143, 145 and accompanying text (noting the reasons for the
growing presence of labor dispatch agencies in China and the lack of oversight they
traditionally received).
226. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (explaining the new labor dispatch
regulations introduced by the PRC's 2008 Labor Contract Law).
227. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining that the BCEA grants the
Minister of Labour general authority to set labor policy).
228. See supra notes 93, 182 and accompanying text (stating that about eighty Chinese
enterprises operate in South Africa and that the Minister of Labour is empowered, under the
BCEA, to monitor and report on individual labor sectors).
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the study to formulate a strategy specifically targeted to improving
compliance among Chinese-owned enterprises. Such an initiative
would improve conditions locally for South Africa workers as well as
for their Chinese counterparts.
CONCL USIOV
While recent labor legislation passed by China's central
government represents a substantial step forward in providing greater
worker rights, research shows that protections fall apart as workers
migrate both within China and overseas to Africa. Better enforcement
is necessary to give full effect to these provisions. Similarly, South
Africa's highly developed labor system offers robust protections on
paper, but fails to adequately address the needs of migrant workers on
the ground.
Targeted judicial and legislative reforms can serve to increase
enforcement of these laws and improve access to dispute resolution
mechanisms. Reform also will represent significant progress in
addressing a labor problem that is coming under increasing
international scrutiny. Because these two rapidly developing nations
share a relationship that is unique to the emerging China-in-Africa
story, their efforts to improve these shortcomings can serve as model
to the rest of the continent. As this issue continues to emerge, further
research should identify, in greater detail, how frequently Chinese
workers are accessing dispute resolution mechanisms and how
successful they are in providing redress. China's central government
in Beijing should use this information to develop a cohesive,
sustainable strategy to ensure that workers hold onto their rights
wherever they migrate.

